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ABSTRACT 
 
TURKEY’S CULTURAL INTEGRATION WITH THE EUROPEAN UNION 
(RELIGION AS A FACTOR)  
Gürçel, Tuğba 
M.A., Department of International Relations 
Supervisor: Asst. Prof. Dr. Ali Tekin 
 
September 2007 
 
 
Turkey’s integration with the European Union has been investigated 
through different lenses. When Turkey gained candidacy status in 1999 Helsinki 
Summit, the discussion about Turkey’s cultural/religious dissimilarity with the 
Union became more noticeable. In this context, Turkey’s compatibility with the 
European norms, with specific reference to different religion, needed an attentive 
investigation. Turkey’s fidelity to laicism in the existence of a majority Muslim 
population is of great significance in Turkey’s cultural integration with the EU. The 
fundamentality of religion factor for the European identity and potential 
contribution of laic Turkey to this identity with its different religion/culture are the 
major issues that are tried to be analyzed. This thesis also tries to display what laic 
Turkey will bring into the EU in cultural terms in the case of its full membership. It 
is concluded that Turkey’s integration with the EU is at a bottle neck because of its 
different cultural/religious tradition. Nevertheless, it is not a deadlock. This 
impediment can be overcome with proper understanding of each other and with 
willingness for integration that embraces both European and Turkish cultures.  
Keywords: Religion, Turkey and the European Union, Culture, Identity 
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ÖZET 
 
TÜRKİYE’NİN AVRUPA BİRLİĞİ’NE KÜLTÜREL ENTEGRASYONU 
(DİN FAKTÖRÜ) 
Gürçel, Tuğba 
Yüksek Lisans, Uluslararası İlişkiler 
Tez Yöneticisi: Asst. Prof. Dr. Ali Tekin 
 
Eylül 2007 
 
 
Türkiye’nin Avrupa Birliği ile entegrasyonu değişik yaklaşımlarla 
incelenmiştir. Ancak, 1999 Helsinki Zirvesi’nde adaylık statüsünü elde etmesiyle, 
Türkiye’nin AB’den kültürel ve dini açılardan farklılığı ile ilgili tartışmalar her 
zamankinden daha çok gündeme gelmiştir. Bu bağlamda, Türkiye’nin Avrupa 
normlarına uyumu konusunda, özellikle dine atıfta bulunulduğunda, özenli bir 
inceleme gereksinimi doğmuştur. Türkiye’nin, çoğunluğu Müslüman olan bir 
toplumla laiklik ilkesine bağlı kalması, AB ile kültürel entegrasyonunda dikkat 
edilmesi gerekenlerin başında gelmektedir. Din faktörünün Avrupa kimliği içindeki 
önemi ve Türkiye’nin farklı dini/kültürüyle bu kimliğe potansiyel katkısı bu tezde 
araştırılmaya çalışılan başlıca konular arasındadır. Bu tez, laik Türkiye’nin faklı 
dini/kültürel geleneği ile AB normlarına uyum sağlaması konusunda bir analiz 
sunmayı amaçlamaktadır. Tezin sonucunda, Türkiye’nin AB ile entgrasyonunda 
kültürel/dini farklılıklar nedeniyle bir dar boğazdan geçmekte olduğu ancak bunun 
aşılamaz bir kördüğüm olmadığı yönündedir. Bu engel, tarafların kimlik tanımını 
ortaklaşa yeniden yapılandırma istekleriyle aşılabilir.   
Anahtar Kelimeler: Din, Türkiye ve Avrupa Birliği, Kültür, Kimlik 
 v 
 
 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
 
 
 
I would like to thank Asst. Prof. Dr. Ali Tekin for his valuable supervision and 
encouragement throughout the preparation of this thesis. I also express my 
gratitude to Prof. Dr. Yüksel İnan for his invaluable support, enlightening 
comments and patient guidance in my hard times. I am grateful to Asst. Prof. Aylin 
Güney for her instructive comments for giving the thesis the final version.  
 
I also express appreciation to Assoc. Prof İrem Dikmen for her suggestions and 
encouragement. I would like to extend my gratitude to my sister Dr. Çılga Gürçel-
Resuloğlu for her precious support in my hard times, continuous patience and her 
help for the thesis. I would also like to thank Defne Günay for her advices 
throughout the thesis. 
 
 
I am grateful to my parents, Rukiye and Mahir Gürçel, my sister Çılga Gürçel-
Resuloğlu and her husband Gökhan Resuloğlu who shared the distress of the thesis 
with me. I would never be able to terminate this thesis without the encouragement 
of my mother since the very beginning of my educational life.  
 vi 
 
 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT  ......................................................................................................    iii 
ÖZET  ................................................................................................................     iv 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS  ................................................................................     v 
TABLE OF CONTENTS  .................................................................................     vii 
CHAPTER I:   INTRODUCTION  ...................................................................     1 
CHAPTER II:  IDENTITY QUESTION IN TURKEY’S INTEGRATION  
TO THE EU (DIFFERENT RELIGION FACTOR): 
A CONSTRUCTIVIST APPROACH  ................................................   7    
       2.1  Constructivist Theory  ...........................................................................  8 
       2.2  Turkey’s Cultural Integration with the EU: Identity Question in  
Constructivism  ....................................................................................   10 
CHAPTER III: THE EUROPEAN UNION AND THE  
STATE-RELIGION RELATIONS  .....................................................  18 
       3.1  Religion in the Binding Legal Documents of the EU  ..........................   19 
       3.2  State-Religion Relations in the EU Member States  .............................   21 
       3.3  Shared Values of the EU- Euroethos  ....................................................  30 
       3.4  Christianity as a Fundamental to European Identity-Question of  
Common Practice  ................................................................................    34 
CHAPTER IV: STATE-RELIGION RELATIONS IN SECULAR  
TURKISH REPUBLIC  ........................................................................  39 
4.1 Outlook to Modern Turkish Republic  ....................................................  39   
 vii 
4.2 Principles of Atatürk  ..............................................................................  41 
4.2.1 Nationalism  .................................................................................. 42 
4.2.2 Nationalism and Ziya Gökalp  ...................................................... 43 
4.2.3 Laicism  ........................................................................................  46 
4.3 Laicité in France and Laiklik in Turkey  .................................................  49 
4.3.1 Laicism in the Constitution of the Republic of Turkey ................  49 
4.3.2 Laicism in the West  .....................................................................  53 
4.3.3 Laicité in France  ..........................................................................  55 
4.3.4 Differences and Similarities of Laicism in Turkey and in France   57  
4.3.5 Laicism in the Context of Education  ...........................................  60 
4.3.6 Comparison of France and Turkey in the Practice of Laicism:  
Religious Symbols at Schools .......................................................  63 
CHAPTER V:  ISLAM IN LAIC/SECULAR TURKEY  ...................................   65 
5.1 Turkey as a Secular-Muslim Country  .....................................................  65 
5.2 The Rise of Political Islam-The Role of Political Parties  .......................  68 
5.3 Issues/Institutions at the Center of Debates  ............................................  74 
5.3.1 The Role of Military in Upholding Secularism  ............................  74 
5.3.2 Religion-based Issues/Institutions .................................................  77 
5.3.2.1 İmam Hatip Schools  ...............................................................  79 
5.3.2.2 The Department of Religious Affairs  ………….....................  82 
CHAPTER VI: CONCLUSION............................................................................  85 
BIBLIOGRAPHY  ................................................................................................  92    
APPENDICES 
A. DATA RELATIVE TO CHAPTER 3………………………………  101  
B. DATA RELATIVE TO CHAPTER 4………………………………  105 
C. DATA RELATIVE TO CHAPTER 5………………………………  109 
 vii 
 
 
 
 
 
LIST OF TABLES 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1. State-church Relations in the EU Fifteen...................................................24 
 
2. Political Parties in the Rise of Political Islam............................................66 
 1 
 
 
CHAPTER I 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
Turkey is considered as a civilizational outsider to the European identity by many 
Europeans. The long journey of Turkey1 for full membership to the EU has been 
ruptured many times. After the candidacy status of Turkey in 1999 Helsinki 
Summit, the light at the end of the tunnel was more brilliant than ever. 
Unfortunately, optimism for further integration with the EU is shattered with the 
reluctance of some European leaders as well as European people to accept Turkey’s 
membership. The rationale behind this unwillingness was mostly derived from 
cultural and civilizational concerns because of Turkey’s different religion. While 
Turkey was working hard to satisfy Copenhagen Criteria2, it had to fight in another 
                                                 
1
 Turkey’s relations with the EU started on the basis of a partnership regime established by the 
Ankara Agreement which was signed with the European Community on 12 September 1963. For 
more information on the history of the EU-Turkey relations, please visit: 
http://www.mfa.gov.tr/MFA/ForeignPolicy/MainIssues/TurkeyAndEU/EUHistory.htm 
2
 The related part of the Copenhagen Criteria is “the existence of a functioning market economy as 
well as the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union”. 
Copenhagen Political Criteria implies “the stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule 
 2 
battlefield. Turkey was faced with a pseudo-criterion3, namely cultural difference, 
which needs to be overcome for European membership. 
      
The cultural difference of Turkey; especially its religion, is started to be perceived 
as an invisible barrier for further integration between Turkey and the EU. For some 
Europeans, Turkey’s identity was so different from European identity that the 
integration of Turkey would lead to an end of the EU4. Nonetheless, there is no a 
priori reason for excluding a country on the basis of its religion (Netherlands 
Scientific Council for Government Policy, 2004: 6). Still, religion has arisen as the 
prominent difference of Turkey from the European culture.  
 
This thesis aims to display the scope of European identity and Turkish identity with 
specific reference to the place of religion in order to reach a conclusion on the 
compatibility of Turkey with the EU despite her different religion. Many 
Europeans argue that despite its secular nature, inclusion of a large Muslim 
population will have implications (Delanty and Rumford, 2005: 48). Here the fear 
is that the Islamic tradition will be very visible in the Community and will not be 
integrated. This does not necessarily indicate that Turkey constitutes a danger for 
                                                                                                                                        
of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities”. For more information, visit: 
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/enlargement_process/accession_process/criteria/index_en.htm 
3
 In common parlance, the prefix pseudo is used to mark something as false, fraudulent, or 
pretending to be something it is not. Here, this saying is used for implying that the EU put a 
criterion before Turkey that does not exist in real. 
4
 For example, Valery Giscard d’Estaing is a French centre-right politician who was President of the 
French Republic from 1974 until 1981. He also worked for the formation of the Draft Constitution 
of the EU. Giscard d’Estaing is also known for his strong opposition against Turkey’s membership 
to the EU. He argued that Turkey was not part of Europe.   
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European identity given the prominent slogan of the EU; “diversity in unity”. The 
thesis argues that there is no prescribed religious criterion for the EU membership; 
thus there is no concrete impediment for secular Turkey for its membership. The 
difference of culture/religion may simply bring cultural diversity to the EU instead 
of breaking its unity.  
 
The thesis tries to draw a general picture of the place of religion in Turkey with 
debated issues/institutions as well as the rise of political Islam. Existence of such 
issues causes the reluctance of the EU for further integration with Turkey. This is 
mostly based on the idea that Islam being a religion which has more implications in 
social life of people. In this sense, this thesis also tries to underline the secular 
character of Turkey in the purpose of highlighting the fact that Islamic tradition 
would enhance the cultural diversity while contributing to the civilizational project 
of the EU.  
 
In the EU-Turkey relations a controversial point is where to place Turkey; in 
Europe or in the Middle East. It has also been a matter of debate on Turkey’s 
domestic scene. The question of perceiving Turkey as a part of West or of Muslim 
world is an idea-monger both for Turkey and the EU. Therefore, Turkey’s relations 
with the EU have always suffered an eclipse of identity-culture dilemma. It is 
plausible to state that Turkey neither belongs to Judeo-Christian tradition nor to the 
Arab Islamic culture (Bozdağlıoğlu, 2003: 68). Turkey seems to have chosen its 
 4 
place in the 19th century with its prominent Western inclination. This tendency 
became a façon d’etre5 for the modern Republic of Turkey in accordance with the 
strong will of its founder; Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. 
 
With the foundation of the Turkish Republic, Atatürk set the principles for 
modernization of the country. In the 1920s laicism became the founding principle 
of the Kemalist project of nation-building (Yavuz and Esposito, 2003: xx). 
Kemalist laicism does not only involve separation of politics and religion but also 
displays a positivist stance in restructuring society. Laicism has always been a 
privileged concept within the debate of Turkey’s stance towards religion. 
 
This thesis tries to explore Turkey’s cultural integration with the EU from two 
perspectives. First, it investigates the identity question in the EU and the place of 
religion in the scope of European identity. Second, it displays the place of religion 
in Turkey. It then discusses Islam in Turkey’s laic system and explores the issues 
that concern many Europeans. 
 
The thesis is composed of five chapters; the first chapter is the introduction. The 
second chapter refers to the constructivist approach for providing a perception of 
European identity. In this chapter, identity question is put at the center of 
investigation in order to demonstrate that identities can be redefined. In this 
                                                 
5
 Way of existence. 
 5 
context, Turkey with its different cultural/religious background may lead to a 
relaxation of the definition of the European identity.  
 
The third chapter explores how the EU and its member states deal with religion. It 
questions if there are common practices in the EU member states in state-religion 
relations while investigating the legally binding documents of the EU for a clear 
understanding of the references to Christianity. In the search of fundamentality of 
Christianity within the European identity, the chapter reaches a conclusion on the 
place of Christianity in the shared values of the EU. This conclusion is utilized for 
determining if there are requirements for the position of religion in the member 
states. 
 
After presenting the EU side, the fourth chapter touches upon state-religion 
relations in Turkey. In order to have a proper understanding of those relations, the 
fundamentals of modern Turkish Republic are tried to be investigated in terms of 
Kemalist principles. The two dissimilar concerns of the EU about the laic character 
of Turkey that directly affect state-religion relations are evaluated. The first stems 
form a notion of laicism that leads to a strong state control over the institutions to 
protect them from Islamism. This attitude is criticized by Europeans claiming that it 
restricts religious freedom. The second concern relies on the belief that there will 
be a rise of Islam in Turkey and in the case of full membership; Turkey will bring 
Islamism as a threat to European culture. The first criticism is examined by 
 6 
evaluating laicism in Turkey in comparison with the rather similar practice in 
France in order to provide an assessment on Turkey’s affinity with an important 
case of European practice. The second concern of Europeans is discussed in the 
following chapter that entails the freedom of religion in the context of Islam in laic 
Turkey. 
 
The fifth chapter preludes the place of Islam in Turkey by laying down the rise of 
Islam and the controversial “religious” issues. This chapter aims to discuss the 
concerns of the EU from Turkish side in terms of being too religious and bringing 
this extensive religiosity to the Community. The chapter argues that the state 
authority over religion and rise of Islamism reached equilibrium in Turkey.  
 
Finally, the thesis reaches a conclusion on Turkey’s compatibility with the EU 
despite her different cultural/religious tradition. The secular character of Turkey 
being at a fine equilibrium between rise of Islam and space for religious freedom, 
offers enrichment of the EU identity by her full membership. Relying upon this 
assessment, this thesis aims to demonstrate that Turkey can integrate with the EU, 
without endangering its own culture or European identity.         
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CHAPTER II 
 
 
IDENTITY QUESTION IN TURKEY’S INTEGRATION TO THE 
EU (DIFFERENT RELIGION FACTOR) 
A CONSTRUCTIVIST APPROACH 
 
 
 
This thesis argues that Turkish and European identities can integrate with each 
other. In order to demonstrate this, it will try to deal with religion as a factor that 
seems to be the most controversial issue in cultural integration, for both parts. 
Before proceeding with religion, I would like to draw a general picture of the 
identity question from a Constructivist perspective on the road of integration of 
Turkey and the EU. 
 
Will the Turkish identity be a ‘fringe’ or an indispensable constituent of European 
identity? At this point, the identity concept requires an examination of whether it is 
exogenously given or socially constructed. The constructivist approaches argue the 
 8 
latter and give insight on how identities are constructed and reconstructed. For 
Turkey’s cultural integration to EU with its different religion, constructivist 
theories provide a valuable understanding. In this first chapter, it will be tried to be 
investigated Turkey’s cultural integration with the EU from the theoretical outlook 
provided by Constructivists.  
 
 
2.1 Constructivist Theory 
 
Constructivism assumes that identities are socially constructed. The “social 
construction” implies for constructivists that social reality does not fall from 
heaven, but that human agents construct and reproduce it through their daily 
practices (Risse, 2004: 2). Constructivists do not believe that there is an external 
reality that exists independent from the knowledge or understanding of the subject. 
On the contrary, they argue that social reality is to be made by the human agents. 
By moving from this argument it is possible to end up with the idea that a new 
identity can be formed according to the new conditions and new environment. 
 
For constructivists, identity and culture are independent variables but they are 
employed in accordance with the conceptions of people. According to Adler (1997: 
324) “… the identities, interests and behavior of political agents are socially 
constructed by collective meanings, interpretations and assumptions about the 
 9 
world”. In addition, identities are mostly determined with the understanding of self 
and other. In his work, Gürbüz (2004: 17) underlines two characteristics of identity: 
First, as the product of social and political interaction which is formed due to a 
collective understanding and second, as a dynamic concept. Identity is dependent 
on the agents that constructed it. Therefore, it can be reconstructed in the new 
social context by the agents.  
 
This argument constitutes the basis of my perception on Turkey’s cultural 
integration with the EU with its different religion. The main assumption here is that 
the European identity is constructed by the human actors. This is also the case for 
Turkish identity. According to the famous argument of Huntington, it is very 
difficult, if not impossible, that these identities integrate with each other. There are 
also some prominent figures who oppose to this view (1996: 74). Walter Hallstein6 
claimed that “Turkey is part of Europe” in 1963 Ankara Agreement, at the very 
beginning of Turkey-EU relations (Bozdağlıoğlu, 2003: 70). The fact that Turkey’s 
full integration with the EU is indicated in the Ankara Agreement as the final 
objective, displays the initial view of the EU.   
  
This thesis tries to point out that a new identity can be formulated in the case of the 
willingness of the both sides; the EU and Turkey. In this new identity, both the EU 
and Turkey will bring their authenticities. In order to comprehend whether such a 
                                                 
6
 He was the first President of the Commission of the European Economic Community (EEC). 
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collective identity can be constructed, the thesis will explore the authenticities of 
the EU and Turkey in terms of their different religions in the following chapters.   
 
 
2.2 Turkey’s Cultural Integration with the EU: Identity Question 
in Constructivism 
 
As mentioned in the previous part, the main assumption of this thesis is that 
identity is not given and it is not fixed (Hopf, as cited in Gürbüz, 2004: 25). 
Therefore, identities are constructed and they can be modified. The thesis firstly 
tries to assess the EU identity, on the basis of how the EU defines self and other.  
 
First of all, European identity is constructed in a way that revolves around who can 
and who cannot be considered as ‘European’ (Buzan and Diez, 1999: 41). This 
identity has been built since the very beginning of the foundation of European 
Community by settling down a civilizational project. When the essence of the 
settlement is investigated, it can be observed that the economic integration is just 
seen as a means that serves the realization of a common political identity. Besides, 
the foundation of such a political unity was primarily intended to build peace 
within Europe. For achieving this end, there had been a need to create a European 
identity which will unite Europe under a peaceful umbrella.  
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In order to construct such an identity, European countries counted a set of notions 
which do have the ability to bind them. This combination is defined by Öniş (1999: 
109-110) as: “To an outside observer, a number of powerful notions are associated 
with the idea of a European identity. These typically include social Europe, Europe 
as a promoter of democracy and human rights, Christian Europe, and Europe as a 
global power”. This shows why the EU can be called as a civilizational project. In 
the work of Delanty and Rumford it is asserted: “[…] the idea of a European 
civilizational constellation rather than a single and narrowly defined civilizational 
model is a more appropriate notion” (2005: 30). Thus the enrichment of such 
civilization is possible by increasing its diversity.  
  
At this point, it seems that the five attributions of European demos, defined by 
Jurgen Habermas, clarify what European identity is constituted of: “The neutrality 
of authority, embodied in the separation of church and state, trust in politics rather 
than the capitalist market, an ethos of solidarity in the fight for social justice, high 
esteem for international law and the rights of the individual and support for the 
organizational and leading role of the state” (as cited in Tekin, 2005: 290). These 
characteristics are utilized in order to formulate a meaningful identity that will be 
attributed to the EU for the purpose of considering it as a political unity.  
 
In general terms, constructivist theories argue for the importance of culture and 
identity affinity between Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs) and the 
 12 
EU fifteen by giving reference to their smooth transition to full membership. 
Furthermore, they explain the EU ambivalence towards Turkey in terms of her 
differing identity. However, it is argued in this thesis that Turkey does not 
necessarily have to be detached from her cultural heritage, thus from her identity, 
for the purpose of becoming an EU member. On the contrary, the different identity 
of Turkey has become indispensable for the EU. It is so not only for enriching the 
mosaic of the European culture but also for strengthening the meaning of famous 
slogan; ‘diversity in unity’. This integration will provide a liaison between West 
and Muslim world.  
 
In this manner, the enlargement process of the EU has to be examined very 
attentively in terms of identity problem. The rationale behind the uncomplicated 
acceptation of full membership of the CEECs to the EU should be questioned. 
While doing so, an interesting “coincidence” can be taken into account for a better 
understanding about the significance of European identity in membership question. 
Öniş (1999: 108) reaches a point from the inconsistency in EU’s attitude towards 
CEECs and Turkey. He argues that the emergence of the Central and Eastern 
European countries during the 1990s, and the relative ease of their membership in 
comparison to Turkey, strengthens the view that the EU essentially a civilizational 
project. This attitude is an appropriate instance of EU being an identity-based 
community.   
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From a constructivist perspective, it seems obvious that the difference of attitude to 
CEECs and to Turkey strengthens the argument of EU being culture or civilization 
based formation. Provided that CEECs and Turkey are more or less at the same 
level of economic and political development, there has to be another strong factor 
leading to the unequal treatment per se (naturally). What makes Turkey so 
‘different’ from the EU in terms of identity? In other words, why is Turkey seen as 
an ‘exclus’7 in the eyes of Europe?  
 
In the case of full membership to the EU, Turkey is expected to be a civilizational 
outsider to the European identity and as a result, it will be seen as an ‘exclus’. From 
the other side of the coin, the possibility that Turkey tries to preserve her identity, 
thus stays authentic, will make the EU feel threatened. The fear is based on the idea 
that the integration of Turkey to the EU will cause the dissolution of the unity. 
Because of this fear, EU tries to keep Turkey away from itself, to do what has been 
done to Meursault8 in the end of Camus’ famous novel9.  
 
However, this was not the case since the beginning of the relations between Turkey 
and the EU; they did not always perceive Turkey as a threat since the establishment 
of the relations. In fact, at the beginning of the relations between Turkey and the 
                                                 
7
 ‘Exclus’ is the French word for outsider.  
8
 The name of the main character of the novel. 
9
 Albert Camus, L’étranger. At the end of the story, society decides on the execution of the main 
character. The author points out that it is not just because he killed someone, but because he 
preserved his authenticity. Camus convinces the reader that society makes such a decision because 
of fear from the one who is not like them. Thus the reason of such a radical exclusion is the fact that 
society feels threatened because of the denial of their values by a part of them.  
 14 
Community in 1963, the cultural dissimilarity of Turkey was not that important. In 
other words, Turkey’s cultural and geographical distance from Brussels was not as 
prominent an issue as it would later become. But then, the Community realized her 
difference in terms of identity and started to be afraid of Turkey; which is 
‘different’, ‘other’ or ‘exclus’, no matter how it is identified.  
 
It seems plausible to take into account the self-definition of the EU which shapes 
its relationship with Turkey to a great extent. Buzan and Diez (1999: 42) argue: 
“First, the old game between the EU and Turkey (…) has been played too much 
according to strict ‘inside/outside’ understandings about which relationships are 
possible and desirable within the EU framework. Putting too much emphasis on 
being wholly ‘in’ or ‘not in’ has narrowed political visions in an unhelpful way…”. 
There is no reason to narrow the meaning of self-definition by limiting it with the 
self-definition of another entity. In other words, to define oneself according to what 
one is not consisted of or what one is different from, is to restrict the definition. If 
the EU could integrate with the CEECs, it would not be that hard to ‘absorb’ 
Turkey. Delanty and Rumford affirm that Turkey’s integration will not cause to 
clash of civilizations by making reference to the membership of the CEECs: “The 
differences between the ten new member countries and older fifteen member states 
fall within the extremes that already exist within the latter group” (2005:49). This 
argument can be put in this way; if the EU could integrate with the CEECs, then it 
can integrate with Turkey without trouble.   
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The identification of Turkey as other is a prejudice. Wendt (1995: 75) underlines: 
“All observation is theory-laden in the sense that what we see is mediated by our 
existing theories […] The world is still out there constraining our beliefs, and may 
punish us for incorrect ones”. Therefore, the EU may be mistaken in its perception 
of Turkey. Then, what would be the consequence of this incorrect understanding of 
the EU? It would be to exclude Turkey from European identity; which has many 
vital consequences for the future of both sides. 
 
Furthermore, it is pointed out by some that a further integration between Turkey 
and the EU threatens the social and political self-identification of each to an 
unsustainable degree (Buzan and Diez, 1999: 46). At this point, the constructivist 
arguments clarify how self-identification of both sides can be revised. As self-
identification is not given but constructed, it can be redefined. According to Risse 
(2004: 3), identity can be modified via daily practices of human agents who 
actually create and reproduce it. In fact, this account provides an optimistic view 
about redefinition of identities. However, it does not necessarily imply that Turkey 
and the EU have to be detached from their culture but that they can redefine their 
identities in order to achieve further integration. It will be a reciprocal interaction 
where identities will be redesigned.   
 
 16 
In the changing conjuncture, where a need for revising the self-definitions arose, a 
constructivist would recommend to the EU to make such a revision by taking into 
account the contemporary developments. In this sense, Delanty and Rumford 
(2005: 30) claim that ‘East’ is very influential in shaping European identity. They 
also believe that ‘East’ is primarily represented by Turkey. It is inevitable to give 
credit to this argument, given the change in the conjuncture is the rise of Islamic 
terror concept after September 11. In the overall picture, the strategic importance of 
Turkey is more obvious in the sense that it has the capability to lead a 
rapprochement between the West and Islamic world. Turkey is unique in the 
Muslim world with its secular character. As Tapper (1993: 9) mentions: “Of 
Muslim countries other than those with oil-based economies, Turkey is the most 
industrially and technologically advanced, and the closest economically and 
culturally to Europe and European Community”. In this sense, a rapprochement of 
the EU with Turkey can create favorable ties with the Muslim world.    
 
Another contribution that Turkey’s membership can provide for the EU in terms of 
her Islam religion is to show that EU is not a Christian club as many argue. In other 
words: “…Turkey’s inclusion will highlight the fact that Europe has been home to 
people with religious/cultural backgrounds other than the Judeo-Christian tradition” 
(Tekin, 2005: 297). Delanty and Rumford (2005: 40) agree with this statement and 
claim that a transcontinental European civilization that includes Islam has the same 
roots as the Judeo-Christian civilization. This important issue of religion is also 
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highlighted by the former Foreign Minister of Turkey: “Turkey’s EU membership 
will mean that Europe has achieved such maturity that it can incorporate a major 
Muslim country into its fold and demonstrate that the EU stands for common 
values and institutions rather than a common religion” (Gül, 2004: 2). This 
illustration explains very clearly what Turkey can offer to the EU in terms of her 
different religion. 
 
In this chapter, it is tried to be analyzed identity question in Turkey’s membership 
to the EU from a constructivist approach. The rationale of such an investigation 
was to rely on constructivist perspective in arguing Turkey’s compatibility with the 
identity of the EU. What can be deduced from this part is that identities are 
constructed and they can be reshaped according to the new environment. Therefore, 
the EU and Turkey can revise their identities in the purpose of enrichment in many 
terms.  
 
The following chapter entails the state-religion relations in the EU member states. 
This thesis recognizes religion as an important constituent of identity and conducts 
the study of Turkey’s integration with the EU by referring to its different religion. 
In order to make a decision if Turkey’s Islam religion poses a problem for the 
European identity, the thesis will first try to assess the religious norms of the EU 
and question if there is a common practice.  
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CHAPTER III 
 
 
THE EUROPEAN UNION AND THE STATE-RELIGION 
RELATIONS 
 
 
 
The role of Christianity in the European identity is of great significance in the 
context of Turkey’s cultural integration with the EU. “Despite its apparent secular 
nature, the EU in fact rests on very Christian cultural assumptions” (Weiler as cited 
in Delanty and Rumford, 2005: 48). This chapter will firstly try to analyze the 
freedom of religion and conscience in the binding legal documents of the EU. 
Furthermore, the State-Church relations in the EU member states will be examined. 
It shows that the member states display a considerable variety on this issue. In this 
respect, this part also touches upon the new members and the position of Central 
and Eastern European Countries (CEECs).  
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Consequently, the fundamentality of Christianity for European identity will be 
discussed. And finally, this analysis will reach a conclusion in order to provide an 
understanding of whether religion is an impediment before Turkey’s membership.   
 
 
3.1 Religion in the Binding Legal Documents of the EU 
 
Almost all European countries are a subjected to several international treaties that 
constitute the conditions concerning religious freedom. These conditions have 
direct or indirect binding impacts upon their judges (Shadid and Koningsveld, 
1995: 7). The documents to which the thesis will refer are; Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights10 and European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR)11.  These are 
important documents since both are legally binding and set the fundamentals that 
EU member states are bound with12. The Draft Constitution of the EU13 is also 
important and indicative in this regard but its future is uncertain. From thereon, the 
thesis will firstly refer to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 
                                                 
10
 On December 10, 1948 the General Assembly of the United Nations adopted and proclaimed the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 
11
 The "European Convention on Human Rights" opened for signature by the members of the 
Council of Europe in Rome, on 4 November 1950 and entered into force in 3 September 1953. It 
sets forth a number of fundamental rights and freedoms and all members of the European Union are 
signatories to this Convention. It is also a pre-condition for membership to the EU. Turkey signed 
the Convention in 1950. Total number of the signatories is 46. 
12
 Credit should be given to the “Declaration concerning the Elimination of all forms of Intolerance 
and Discrimination Based on Religion and Philosophy of Life” of 1981in putting stress on religious 
freedom, Shadid and Koningsveld, 7. 
13
 The Draft Constitution for Europe is signed in October 2004. Following the rejection of the 
European Constitution by France and the Netherlands in 2005 and a two year period of reflection, 
on the 23rd of June 2007 the EU leaders agreed on a detailed mandate for a new Intergovernmental 
Conference. The task of this Intergovernmental Conference will be to draw up a Reform Treaty by 
the end of 2007. For detail please visit: http://europa.eu/institutional_reform/index_en.htm 
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The first document, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights asserts that  
Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this 
right includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either 
alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his 
religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship and observance (Article 18).  
 
The assertion of freedom of conscience and religion as fundamentals in one of the 
most significant documents for the spirit of the EU shows that freedom of religion 
is a major issue in the EU context. According to this article, each EU citizen has 
right to freedom of religion but it does not indicate that this religion should be 
Christianity. Besides, this article recognizes right to live one’s own religious belief 
in private or community, in addition to the right to teach or manifest it freely. This 
means that whichever religion one belongs to, one can practice it freely in the EU 
member states. This is also mentioned in the ECHR (Article 9). The statements on 
freedom of religion are similar to the ones of Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights. In the ECHR there is no specific reference to Christianity but to freedom of 
thought, religion and conscience (Article 9.1). So, the inevitable question here is: 
Are there any indications about Christianity in the main documents of the EU? 
 
This is the source of the debate about the specific reference to Christianity in the 
Preamble of the Draft Constitution for Europe. There is an ongoing debate on 
where to put religion in the European integration. In one hand, some (for example, 
Weiler, 1999) declare that Christianity is one of the universal values that attach 
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member states. On the other hand, for some (for example, Menendez, 2005) 
Christianity does not have such a role. To what extent Christianity has influence on 
the formation of European identity is still a matter of controversy. According to 
Menendez (2005: 179), considering individual and collective identities of 
Europeans being shaped by Christian values in an inevitable manner is a simplistic 
approach which limits us in a premature relation among history, memory and 
identity. Even if it is obvious that Christianity constitutes a valuable ingredient of 
European identity, there seems to be no concrete reason for mentioning it in the 
Preamble of the Draft Constitution for Europe. To decide whether Christianity is a 
sine qua non for European identity that should explicitly be mentioned in the 
Preamble, there should be common or shared values and practices. Therefore, it 
should be questioned if there is a common practice for Christianity in the EU 
member states.  
 
 
3.2 State-Religion Relations in the EU Member States 
 
This part will try to evaluate the state-religion relations in the member states for 
deciding if there is a common practice for religion in the EU. It is important to 
make an evaluation of state-church relations because: “To understand the political 
importance of religious actors, we need to comprehend what they say and do in 
their relationship with the state” (Haynes, 1998: 6). The first assumption while 
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studying state and church relations in the European context is the fact that state-
church separation displays a variation among the member states. However, from a 
general point of view, as Haynes (1998: 8) mentions, in traditional European-
centered perspective both church and state have equal power in relation to each 
other. According to Cullinan (2003) this variation is based on cultural and historical 
background of the member states: “Ultimately at issue are the idiosyncratic church-
state arrangements shaped by particular historical circumstances in every European 
state”. Halman and Draulans (2006: 266) also state that the contemporary church-
state relationships are grounded in country-specific historical-political 
developments. In such an environment of variety, this chapter concentrates on the 
search for common values and practices in religion for the member states of the 
EU. Therefore, the thesis will deal with all the members of the EU in terms of state-
church relations. For the first step, it will refer to some general remarks and 
comparisons between member states in the matter of religion.   
 
According to the work of Netherlands Scientific Council for Government Policy 
(2004: 31): “Only the Netherlands, France and, until the fall of communism, most 
Central and Eastern European countries can be classified as states that have cut the 
constitutional ties between the dominant religion or church and the state...” In 
contrary, England has a state church led by the head of the state. Denmark and 
Greece also have state churches (Delanty and Rumford, 2005: 48). In the countries 
like Poland, Greece, Ireland, Bulgaria and Romania religion stayed remarkably 
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dominant (Netherlands Scientific Council for Government Policy, 2004: 31). This 
situation gives an idea about the lack of a common practice for state church 
relations among the EU member states.  
 
Another general assessment comes from Haynes (1998: 64). He states that the 
relations between State and Church in Protestant societies like England and 
Denmark are shaped by “de facto co-option” of state by religion. Furthermore, it is 
argued that for Catholic France, this relationship between state and church was 
observed as “hostility and partial repression” (Haynes: 1998: 64). Lastly, Haynes 
(1998: 64) evaluates that in Catholic Spain since Franco and in Italy after World 
War I, state and church have been “allies”. This grouping by Haynes (1998) draws 
a general layout; however it might be better to scrutinize state-religion relations in 
these countries in more detail.  
 
It seems fair to start with the founders of the EU and analyze Benelux countries. 
Belgium does not have a state religion in the Constitution14. The neutrality of the 
state in religious matters is clearly indicated. In addition, the financial relations 
between state and religion are regulated in the Constitution. In Netherlands, the 
relations between state and religion are prescribed in the Constitution in three 
principles. These principles are religious freedom, non-discrimination based on 
religion and freedom of education (Shadid and Koningsveld, 1995: 18-19). Similar 
                                                 
14
 For the English version of the Constitution of Belgium: http://www.fed-
parl.be/constitution_uk.html 
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to Belgium, in Netherlands the confessional schools can get financial aid from state 
if they fulfill legal requirements. Religious freedom in the Constitution of 
Luxemburg15 is prescribed in 1868 well before than other countries. In Luxemburg, 
the subsidies to private religious schools are provided as well as there is the 
opportunity for religious education in public schools. Thus, it can be stated that 
among the Benelux countries, Luxemburg is the one where the state finances 
religion the most. Besides, among the founders of the EU, Germany and France are 
of sui generis feature in terms of State and Church relations. 
 
The work of Netherlands Scientific Council for Government Policy (2004: 31-36) 
indicates that Germany has strict neutrality among religions but the state has a 
positive approach towards churches. The German Constitution guarantees the 
freedom of religion and the relation between the state and religion is prescribed in 
many articles (for example, Article 4)16. The most significant ones are the 
separation of state and religion which also prohibits the existence of a state church, 
neutrality of state towards different religions and the right to self-determination for 
the religious communities (Shadid and Koningsveld, 1995: 12). Actually, this does 
not necessarily mean that state does not acknowledge the importance of religious 
activities. Haynes (1998: 73) analyzes this phenomenon as: “The reunification of 
the two Germanies led to the churches becoming relatively politically marginalized 
                                                 
15
 For the English version of the Luxemburg Constitution: 
http://www.servat.unibe.ch/law/icl/lu00000_.html 
16
 For the English version of the German Constitution: http://www.vescc.com/constitution/germany-
constitution-eng.html 
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in the 1990s”. Thus, religion in Germany is regulated with neutrality of the state; 
however, church has tenure in the eyes of the State. Nonetheless; for France, which 
is one of the founders of the EU, it is not the case. 
 
France, in this thesis, needs a more detailed investigation since it is the only 
country where the principle of laicism has a special scope. Hence, in the following 
parts, French laicism will be re-examined. In France, the Article 2 of the 
Constitution prescribes the relations between state and church. As the French 
Republic is a “laicist” state, it stays neutral in religious affairs. Like in many other 
Western countries, France has the freedom of conscience and religion guaranteed 
by the constitutional tradition. However, France has specificity in this matter as 
Shadid and Koningsveld (1995: 13) comment: “Contrary to the situation prevailing 
in many other West-European countries, the principle of laicism implies that the 
State neither recognizes nor finances or subsidizes any religious cult”. In addition, 
the French State does not permit religious organizations to serve in any other field 
than the religious ones (Shadid and Koningsveld, 1995: 13). In this way, the 
engagement of churches in social life is restricted.   
 
The Stasi Commission Report17 makes laicism more visible in the French Republic. 
This report highlights the laic character of France by giving reference to the 
                                                 
17
 Commission de Réflection is installed by President Jacques Chirac in 3 July 2003 in order to 
make reflection about the application of laicité in France. Since the Commission is headed by 
Bernard Stasi, the Commission is also called as Stasi Commission. The Commission has prepared a 
Report on this specific issue.  
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separation of state and church with a law dating back to 1905. As a matter of fact, 
this principle is a historical tradition that found its place in the Constitution. 
Therefore, France explicitly declares laicité as a constitutional tradition for the 
French Republic.  
 
When it comes to Italy, it has passed a long and complex road for the establishment 
of the state-church relations. At the end, with the conclusion of a new concordat 
with the Roman Catholic Church in 1984, a new era for this relationship has been 
approved (Shadid and Koningsveld, 1995: 16). The Concordat states that Catholic 
religion is no longer the official religion of the State. This was a remarkable turning 
point for the place of religion for the Italian State.  
   
 
Table 1: State-church Relations in the EU Fifteen18  
 
Belgium Belgium does not have a state religion in the Constitution. 
Netherlands The state-religion relations are prescribed in the Constitution. 
Luxemburg Religious freedom is prescribed in the Constitution in 1800s. 
Germany There is strict neutrality among religions but the state has a 
positive approach towards churches. The Constitution 
guarantees the freedom of religion and the relation between the 
state and religion is prescribed in many articles. 
France  The Article 2 of the Constitution prescribes the relations 
between state and church. The French Republic is a “laicist” 
                                                 
18
 The founding members of the EU are previously evaluated in the text. 
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state and it stays neutral in religious affairs. It has the freedom 
of conscience and religion guaranteed by the Constitution. 
Italy There is no prescribed state religion indicated in the 
Constitution. 
England The Church is the national Church established by law and it is 
represented in Parliament. The Queen of England is the 
constitutional head of State and formal head of the Anglican 
Church19. Since there is no written Constitution, the principle 
of religious freedom is guaranteed with special laws and 
international treaties. In England, neither the State Church nor 
the other churches or religious communities get any financial 
aid from the State20.   
Ireland In becoming member of the European Community in 1973, it 
rejected the clause in the previous Constitution recognizing the 
“special position” of the Roman Catholic Church. There are 
close historical ties between State and Church so that Catholic 
Church is still very influential in many respects in social life.    
Denmark Evangelical Lutheran church is the national church; therefore 
state is not neutral in religious affairs. The freedom of religion 
is guaranteed in the Constitution.     
Greece Orthodox Church is determined as the dominant religion in 
1975 Constitution. Other confessional denominations are 
considered as “known” religions. The dominant Church is 
involved in public life to a great extent. It is also argued that 
the Orthodox Church operates both in law and in actual life as 
the State religion. 
Portugal Churches are independent from state and the principle of 
freedom of religion is guaranteed by the Constitution for 
everyone regardless of their convictions.  
Spain In the Spanish Constitution, the State is defined as non-
confessional and laic. The State should be at equal distance to 
every religion and should treat equally believers and non-
believers. State can also cooperate with churches and religious 
denominations in the purpose of guaranteeing the freedom of 
religion of citizens. But this cooperation should not violate the 
laic nature of the State. Yet, it is a Constitutional obligation 
that the king is a Catholic Christian21.  
                                                 
19
 Haynes, Jeff. 1998. Religion in Global Politics. London and New York: Longman. 
20
 Shadid W.A.R and Van Koningsveld P.S. 1995. Religious Freedom and the Position of Islam in 
Western Europe: Opportunities and obstacles in the acquisition of equal rights. Netherlands: Kok 
Pharos Publishing House. pp. 11-17. 
21
 Dünyada Din-Devlet İlişkileri: Ülkeler Arası Karşılaştırmalar. Gazeteciler ve Yazarlar Vakfı 
Yayınları: 12. İstanbul: 2002. p.9. 
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Austria Freedom of religion is provided by the Constitution. The State 
is secular; however, the Roman Catholic Church is the 
predominant religion so that the religious holidays are also 
government holidays22.  
Finland The Evangelical Lutheran Church and the Orthodox Church are 
the state churches. Freedom of religion is guaranteed by the 
Constitution23.  
Sweden   The Constitution provides for freedom of religion. Since the 
separation of church and state in 2000, eight recognized 
religious denominations, in addition to the Church of Sweden, 
raise revenues through member-contributions made through the 
national tax system24. The references to religion in the 
Constitution were omitted but the king still has to be Lutheran 
Christian25. 
 
Belgium, the Netherlands, Austria and Germany have no state church. Contrary to 
France; they support religious pluralism in many fields (Netherlands Scientific 
Council for Government Policy, 2004: 37). In contrast to these countries, England 
has a state church under the command of the head of state, as a constitutional 
tradition (Delanty and Rumsford, 2005: 48). Thus, it seems very plausible to argue 
that the constitutional traditions vary from one member country to the other in 
terms of state-church relations. 
 
Now, it is reasonable to deal with the ten new member states26 of the EU, in other 
words, the state church relations in the Central and Eastern European Countries 
                                                 
22
 http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2006/71367.htm 
23
 http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2006/71379.htm 
24
 http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2006/71410.htm 
25
 Dünyada Din-Devlet İlişkileri: Ülkeler Arası Karşılaştırmalar. Gazeteciler ve Yazarlar Vakfı 
Yayınları: 12. İstanbul: 2002. p.9. 
26
 In 2004, the EU underwent a historic enlargement to 10 countries of Central and Eastern Europe 
and the Mediterranean: Czech   Republic, Estonia, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Malta, 
Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia. It was a unique, historic enlargement which signified the re-
unification of Europe after decades of division by an Iron Curtain. See also: 
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/enlargement_process/past_enlargements/index_en.htm 
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(CEECs). This investigation will enlighten the way that the EU treats against new 
members in terms of their legal, administrative and social practice in religion27. 
Among the ten new members, only Estonia has a separation between state and 
church. Besides, Malta has a state religion; Roman Catholicism. For the rest, there 
are some who are more flexible against different religions and some who are strict. 
In such an environment, it is plausible to state that they have varying approaches to 
the freedom of religion and conscience in their national constitutions. As a matter 
of fact, the EU has welcomed the CEECs with their variety of state-religion 
relations. Since there are no related criteria with religion of the member states, 
there was no emphasis on how religion is being practiced in those countries28. The 
CEECs are evaluated according to Copenhagen Criteria and found compatible with 
the EU norms.  
 
While deciding which country is compatible with the European norms, the EU has 
to be certain about its shared values. In other words, Europeans need to recognize 
what constitute their civilizational association. In this sense, the place of religion 
among the principles that stick European people with each other can be better 
analyzed from a broader perspective. The EU conducts research activities in order 
to explore the shared values.  
 
                                                 
27
 See Table 1, Table 2 and Table 3 in the Appendices. 
28
 Copenhagen Criteria and their applicability to Turkey is investigated in the working paper. The 
related part is the Copenhagen Political Criteria which is composed of stability of institutions 
guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for protection of minorities. See 
http://www.oeies.or.at/PolKrit_englisch.pdf 
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3.3 Shared values of the EU-EuroEthos 
 
This part displays with the consequences that can be deduced from this sample 
research. EuroEthos is a specific targeted research project29 that aims to explore the 
Scope for a Shared European Pluralistic Ethos and to make a comparative 
investigation of religious and secular ethically-derived requests for exemption from 
the law in an enlarging Europe. It is expected that the study of such issues provides 
indications on how European societies try to handle a plurality of values. The 
plurality of values is of great significance in the membership question of Turkey. 
This project can be evaluated as an inner search for shared values of Europe. 
Turkey’s taking part of this project will lead to acknowledge whether it shares the 
same values with the EU. This is why, this project is tried to be evaluated under the 
scope of this thesis. 
 
There are four main objectives of the project: 
1. to develop and organize knowledge on cases in which religious and ethical 
secular values lead to the definition politically relevant claims 
2. to raise historical awareness of the relationship between plural values and 
political stances 
                                                 
29
 Under the “Sixth Framework Programme Priority 7; Citizens and Governance in a Knowledge 
Based Society”. The project’s dissemination activities include conferences and a publication 
strategy aiming to communicate results to an academic and non-academic public. The researchers 
involved are from different areas of expertise in order to provide a nuanced outlook on the issue. 
The description of the work has been prepared by 28 September 2006. The Euroethos Project is 
supervised by the Commission of the EU.  
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3. to analyze the influence of diverse cultural heritage on the political views of 
citizens in the enlarging Europe 
4. to study the scope for a European ethos as a precondition for political 
integration. 
In order to achieve these objectives, “the project will compile a database of cases of 
requests for exemption from the law, and run a comparative analysis focusing on 
the two case studies”30. Based on this analysis, normative guidelines will be 
developed regarding the specific forms in which pluralistic European ethos should 
be realized. For this thesis, the potential place of Turkey is considered in such a 
pluralistic European ethos. 
 
For the first step of the project, it is tried to provide a better understanding of the 
fundamental concepts that constitute the basis of the exemption from law. In other 
words, the ethically-derived reasons of the requests for the exemption from law are 
evaluated. A database31 is formed. It contains cases of demands of exemption from 
the law (including cases of conscientious objection, civil disobedience and legal 
protest) on religious and secular ethical grounds in some EU countries. In 
particular, the sample of countries includes long-established Member States (Italy, 
Spain, France, Germany, United Kingdom), countries that have fairly recently 
joined the EU (Czech and Slovak Republics), and an Associate candidate State 
                                                 
30
 EuroEthos Annex I-Description of Work p.3 
31
 The cases in the database, have been compiled through a review and analysis of secondary 
literature and media, the screening of laws, court cases and churches’ official documents so as to 
identify both qualitative and quantitative data sources (at national, regional and European levels) on 
the topic. See website: http://euroethos.lett.unitn.it/home.php?database 
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hoping to be included in the future (Turkey). It will be the main source of 
information for all the research activities carried out in the project. 
 
The collection of data also displays variance among the EU countries in terms of 
the value-basis of the law questioned, the reasons of the requests for exemption 
from law and the legal response. This divergence indicates that European societies 
do not embrace a common position in their interaction with ethical values, neither 
do the states. In the search of shared values of Europe, the diversity of attitudes of 
societies and states as well as the dissimilarity of the controversial issues confirm 
that there are no prescribed ethical values that are common to the member states. 
Nonetheless, this does not necessarily indicate that there are no similarities among 
the member states in terms of ethical values. What can be underlined here is that 
the similarities are mostly based on geographical proximities and sharing the same 
history.  
 
In the project, it can be observed the similarity between Germany and France on the 
issues put in question as well as the state responses to them. That was also the case 
for Czech Republic and Slovak Republic. Provided that they share the same Soviet 
past, societies and states act in similar ways in terms of the requests for exemption 
from law. Therefore, it can be realized that shared values of the EU are not out 
there waiting to be discovered but they are being constructed. In this sense, new 
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members and Turkey do not seem to have difficulties in complying with European 
values.  
 
When it comes to the value-added of Turkey, it is stated in the “Description of 
Work” that “the presence of Turkey in the sample is of paramount importance, 
given the unique nature of its internal composition combining a solid secular 
democratic tradition with the widespread presence of committed Muslims”32. 
Turkey’s being part of the project also gives the opportunity to “identify the areas 
of overlap between Christian and Islamic value systems, and between the European 
and Turkish process of secularization”33. It is also expected that due to this 
investigation, an analysis can be made about “the problems faced by Muslims when 
confronted with the demands of a secularized integration process”34. This will also 
lead for the EU to have a better understanding on how Muslim minorities can be 
integrated to the European society.  
 
The first impression that I got from the unfinished EuroEthos project is that Turkey 
is not that dissimilar in terms of its responses to the requests for exemption from 
law on the basis of religion and secularity. The next step of the project is to select 
two countries to compare with each other in terms of the requests and responses for 
the exemption from law in religious terms. It seems to me that Turkey will be 
grouped with France since these cases display similarity. Here, what makes these 
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 Euroethos Annex I-Description of Work p. 9 
33
 Euroethos Annex I-Description of Work p. 9 
34
 Euroethos Annex I-Description of Work p. 9 
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two countries proximate is the resemblance of their conception of laicism. Even if 
the responses of the states do not match, the points raised by French and Turkish 
societies are similar. It will be significant to compare Turkey and France in the next 
step for a healthier understanding of how societies and states perceive the similar 
problems and how they react. In this way, Turkey’s compatibility with the 
European ethical values will be illuminated.    
 
 
3.4 Christianity as a Fundamental Factor to European Identity-
Question of Common Practice 
 
This part will evaluate if Christianity is one of the defining elements of European 
identity. There are divergent views on Christianity being a fundamental for 
European identity. For some politicians and scholars, European identity is 
inseparable from Christianity. Jacques Delors, the president of the EC in 1989 
indicated that “Europe was a product of Christianity, of Roman Law and of Greek 
humanism” (Kütük, 2006: 276).  
 
It is not very astonishing for Pope Jean Paul II to highlight the significance of 
Christianity for the unity of Europe. It is still reasonable for the Pope to perceive 
Christianity as a gluing factor among EU member states. According to his opinion: 
“A united Europe is no longer only a dream. It is an actual process, which cannot 
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be purely political or economic. It has profound cultural, spiritual and moral 
dimension. Christianity is at the very roots of European culture” (as cited in Tekin, 
2005: 293). Therefore, Christianity is naturally considered to be a sine qua non for 
the Pope and for some others. For example, Wooden (2007) states:  
Many church leaders and Catholic activists had criticized the proposed 
constitution for failing to make an explicit reference to the Judeo-Christian 
roots of Europe and a commitment to ensuring that EU policies would 
reflect Judeo-Christian values. 
 
From the point of view of this group, Christianity requires more apparent reference 
in the Draft Constitution for Europe. 
 
According to some scholars and some political leaders (for example, Giscard 
d’Estaing, Angela Merkel and Nicolas Sarkozy) Christianity is so powerful in the 
European integration process that it leads to differentiation of Europe from the 
Muslim world. This claim explains why Europeans refer to Christianity in an 
inevitable manner while they bring up their ethical values (Menendez, 2005: 185).  
 
For Valery Giscard d’Estaing, Christianity is the basis for EU membership. What is 
more, Cullinan (2003) appreciates Giscard d’Estaing for putting forward the issue 
of religion in the membership and enlargement question; which is the concern of 
many people in Europe whom he calls as bien-pensants35. Thus he believes that 
Giscard d’Estaing is worthy of special thanks: “In any case, Giscard himself 
                                                 
35
 With this French word, Cullinan means the ones who reflect; “well-thinkers”, in other words; the 
intellectuals. 
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deserves credit for putting in play the issue of religion and the EU constitution, 
though one suspects this was a wholly unintended consequence”. These are the 
remarks and concerns of some scholars and politicians on the importance of 
religion in the EU that should be kept in mind while retrieving conclusions.  
 
To conclude this part, there are no explicit expectations from the member states to 
have the same standards for religious norms and their place in the national 
constitutions. Therefore, it would be nonsense to set such criteria for the late-
comers. On the contrary, each and every document that EU members are subject to, 
explicitly stresses the freedom of religion and conscience. Furthermore, there is no 
cultural, historical or religious background prescribed for the member countries or 
for the potential members. According to Netherlands Scientific Council for 
Government Policy (2004: 38): 
All the same, its political-civic union of values assumes the existence of a 
state that guarantees the autonomy of church and state and protects general 
religious freedoms and rights. How this autonomy and protection are 
implemented, and the exact status of religion, varies widely in practice from 
country to country. 
 
One of the conclusions that can be deduced is that the EU member states do not 
have standards for religion. Therefore, no a priori conditions can be imposed to the 
candidate countries on these subjects (Netherlands Scientific Council for 
Government Policy, 2004: 38). In other words, Christianity does not seem to have a 
formal role in European polity but it is often utilized for legitimizing the existing 
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institutional arrangements (Delanty and Rumford, 2005: 48). This is one of the 
most significant conclusions that can be derived from this part. 
 
The debate on special reference to Christianity in the Preamble of the Treaty 
establishing a Constitution for Europe was an instructive one. Ferrari (2005: 1) 
asserts: 
Now a brief survey of relations between democracy, secularity and religion 
in Europe can lead to the following observation: not only do the religions 
continue to conserve an important political role but, above all, this role 
depends precisely on the features of European constitutionalism...   
 
Furthermore, another conclusion can be to highlight that the explicit reference to 
religion in the Draft Constitution for Europe seemed to be unnecessary at some 
point. One of the reasons is that a reference to Christianity may cause to favor a 
group over another, within the Union as well as in its relation with the countries 
outside of the Community. In other words, expressing religion in such documents 
may lead to the formation of “in-group” “out-group” within the Union since there is 
a variety of practice in member states in means of state-church relations. Menendez 
(2005: 183) declares that such explicit references can come out the differences and 
jeopardize unity of the Community by causing Europeans “to remain others to each 
other”.  
 
Furthermore, in the external relations of the EU will be more shaded by the 
“Christian Club” image. This also indicates that such a reference to religion would 
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affect the external relations of the Union by leading to a cliché against the EU. At 
the end, the EU members decided not to make reference to religion in the Preamble 
of the Draft Constitution. This is the most concrete indicator about the standpoint 
of the EU in the context of religion.  
 
In the next chapter, the state-religion relations in Turkey will be evaluated. They 
are of sui generis character, which is different from other secular countries. This 
character will be studied by first referring to the fundamental principles of Turkish 
Republic laid down by Atatürk and then, laicism in comparison with the French 
understanding of laicité. The thesis will try to also analyze Turkey as a Muslim 
country in order to display the recent situation of Turkey in terms of interaction 
among secularism, Europeanization and Islamism.  
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CHAPTER IV 
 
 
STATE-RELIGION RELATIONS IN SECULAR TURKISH 
REPUBLIC 
 
 
 
 Outlook to History of Modern Turkish Republic 
 
Turkey’s adventurous modernization process is used to be perceived as the 
institutional reforms since the 19th century. However, the history of modern 
Turkish Republic began as the sum of reforms and principles set by the founder and 
the leader of the Turkish Republic; Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. For this reason, the 
republican revolution can be defined as the change of values (Mardin as cited in 
Tapper, 1993: 6). After the War of Independence, for the new country that he 
founded Atatürk laid down fundamental principles. Mustafa Kemal was aware that 
the principles on which he founded the state should have been preserved in order 
that Turkey could live after the death of its founder.  
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For Mustafa Kemal, modernization in terms of achieving the level of Western 
civilization was one of the main aims. Berkes (1964: 464) mentions that Atatürk 
was strict for achieving this end: “A recurrent theme of his speeches in 1924 was 
the absolute determination to achieve an unconditional transformation to Western 
civilization and to destroy all forces of reaction”. Atatürk set six main principles in 
order to provide the continuity of the state with the notions that first gave its birth. 
These principles are republicanism, nationalism, populism36, étatism, laicism and 
reformism.  
 
Atatürk aimed to save the country and to create a new state. In this new state, the 
traditions and authenticity were going to be preserved whereas the regime was 
going to be totally different. Mustafa Kemal believed that the period of 
modernization was a must for the new regime. In his view, modernization was 
supposed to be a dynamic process in which Turkey would turn its face to the West 
whereas it would consciously keep its roots. In the Kemalist perception of 
modernization, Westernization was considered as the way to reach the level of 
contemporary civilizations. Huntington underlines that Atatürk was aware of the 
need of Westernization for Turkey:  
In embarking to this course, and rejecting the Islamist past, Atatürk made 
Turkey a “torn country,” a society which was Muslim in its religion, 
heritage, customs, and institutions but with a ruling elite determined to 
make it modern, Western, and at one with the West (1996: 74). 
   
                                                 
36
 It means being for the people; halkçılık. 
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In this way, Atatürk pursued a “third choice” by combining modernization with the 
preservation of the authentic culture of Turkey with fundamental values, practices 
and institutions (Huntington, 1996: 74).  
 
The driving motive behind Turkish modernization movement was Kemalist radical 
reform process (Kili, 2003: 143). In other words, Atatürk was the force for 
modernization with his strong belief in Turkey’s honorable place in the future. To 
these ends, he abolished the sultanate and the caliphate, which he saw as the 
symbolic and substantive sources of Turkish degradation. These far-reaching 
reforms and the decisiveness of the leader who set the principles constituted the 
skeleton of Turkish modernization as well as the future of the Republic. 
 
 
  Principles of Atatürk 
 
The fundamental principles determined by Atatürk constitute the basis for a proper 
understanding of state-religion relations in Turkey. In the Ottoman era, the 
governing tradition of the state was left in the hands of Sultanate who was seen as 
the delegation and the reflection of the will of God. Ottoman heritage of personal 
will on governing the state was converted to national will; sovereignty of the 
people (Kili, 2003: 298). Thus, due to the abolishment of Sultanate on 1 November 
1922 and the proclamation of the Republic on 29 October 1923, Turkish nation 
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gained the right to govern itself. In the next part, it will be referred to some of the 
fundamental principles of Atatürk. Nationalism and laicism are important in the 
scope of this thesis for evaluating Turkey’s compatibility with the European norms.  
 
 
 Nationalism   
 
The principle of nationalism is one of the prominent notions indicated in the 1924 
Constitution of the Republic of Turkey37. In the Constitutions of 196138 and 198239 
the principle of nationalism is designated both in the Preamble and in many other 
articles. One of the important characters of nationalism in Turkey is that 
sovereignty is left in the hands of Turkish Nation (Feyzioğlu, 1992: 282).  
 
There are three important notions in Kemalist nationalism; these are “sharing the 
same territory”, being “subject to the same laws and united in morals and 
language” (Mango: 2002: 24). What is more, nationalism in Kemalist ideology was 
“unique” in the sense that it did not look like the other practices in the world and 
that it served well for the formation of a peaceful national identity. Kushner (1997: 
222) states: “The basis of the new republic was to be found in loyalty both to the 
homeland Anatolia and to the Turkish nation which inhabited it”. As a result, 
                                                 
37
 Article 2 of the 1924 Constitution of the Republic of Turkey: 
http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/anayasa/anayasa24.htm 
38
 1961 Constitution: http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/anayasa/anayasa61.htm 
39
 1982 Constitution: http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/Anayasa.htm 
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people who are living within the borders of Turkey; i.e. the citizens of the Turkish 
state, are considered as Turks. As a matter of fact, such an understanding of 
nationalism does not contradict with modernization. On the contrary Kemalist view 
underlines the importance of modernization while staying attached to nationalism. 
Kushner (1997: 222) refers to the Kemalist doctrine by highlighting that the main 
purpose of Turkey is the “attainment of contemporary civilization” which means 
the western civilizations for Atatürk. The reason that it is mentioned in this thesis is 
that one way for Turkey to be at the same level of civilization with the West is to 
integrate with the EU.  
 
Indeed, Mustafa Kemal was not the only one who was making the distinction 
between attaining the level of contemporary western civilization and attaching 
robustly to the authentic culture of Turkey. Atatürk was affected by the thoughts of 
Ziya Gökalp, an important Turkish thinker, who differentiates between culture and 
civilization.  
 
 
 Nationalism and Ziya Gökalp 
 
Ziya Gökalp has been very influential in the nineteenth century with his arguments 
about modernization/Westernization of Turkey. The distinction that he makes 
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between the two concepts, culture and civilization40, is still being utilized as an 
impulse for understanding the blurred line between modernization and authenticity. 
In the work of Berkes (1959: 269) the definition of civilization according to Gökalp 
is given as the sum of certain institutions, of certain ways of thinking and acting. 
And he differentiates culture from civilization by asserting that culture is the sum 
of institutions peculiar to particular nation (Berkes, 1959: 269). Ziya Gökalp 
asserted that the characteristics which fall under culture should be preserved while 
civilization and technology that are developed in the West should be followed. 
According to his view, culture is specific for each and every nation but civilization 
can be common to all and be pursued by each state.  
 
This very thought preludes the relations of a nation state with the rest of the world. 
Nationalism that excludes other nations and isolates oneself contradicts with 
Kemalist understanding of nationalism. Berkes (1959: 283) refers to the statement 
of Gökalp: “Our national life means living our own national culture. Our 
international life consists of our participation in international civilization, on the 
one hand, and in several unique and original cultures, on the other”. Gökalp 
believes that modernization and participation to the international environment leads 
to the guardianship of the international society over the states (Heyd, 2001: 67). In 
other words: “The existence of the national culture of a nation does not preclude its 
participation in an international civilization” (Berkes, 1959: 281). Moreover, in the 
                                                 
40
 Hars ve medeniyet. 
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view of Gökalp the only way to combine nationalism with “cosmopolitism” is the 
“moral patriotism” (Heyd, 2001: 67).  
 
Berkes (1959: 269) tries to clarify Gökalp’s specific argument about states having 
different religions sharing the same civilization:  
Societies foreign to each other from the point of view of culture or of religion may 
belong to the same civilization. Just as differences in culture do not necessarily bar 
sharing the same religion, so differences in culture and in religion do not prevent 
association within the same civilization. 
  
In his view, the movements of modernization have failed in the Ottoman Empire 
because they just tried to imitate European civilization in appearance (Berkes, 
1959: 270). However, in Kemalist perception of nationalism, which is affected by 
the sound argument of Gökalp to a great extent, modernization seems to be 
compatible with the preservation of culture. As Kushner (1997: 222) states, “a 
proud member of the Turkish nation” should possess both nationalism and western 
notions in his character.  
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 Laicism41 
 
Atatürk was for leaving the future of the state to the hands of the Turkish people 
and to their sovereignty. In order to do so, the shadow of Sultanate and Caliphate 
should have been eliminated since they were very influential on behalf of people. If 
these institutions had continued to exist, sovereignty of people would have never 
worked efficiently. Atatürk saw this fact very rationally and concluded that this was 
to be made with coercion, if necessary. Atatürk was very strict on this issue and he 
mentioned that everyone should accept that sovereignty will be given to Turkish 
people and that otherwise coercive measures will be taken (Berkes, 1964: 450).  
 
Laicism constitutes an essential part of modernization of Turkey. Tapper (1993: 2) 
asserts that laicism has emerged as “one of the key principles of Atatürk’s new 
state”. In accordance with this view, “religious expression came under strict 
government supervision and control” (Tapper, 1993: 2). Moreover, as Kili (2003: 
352) claims, Atatürk’s conception of laicism is a multifaceted principle covering a 
large space in Turkish state: “Atatürk laicism did not merely mean separation of 
                                                 
41
 There is a confusion of definitions for laicité (in French), laiklik (in Turkish) versus laicisme (in 
French) and “laikçilik” (in Turkish). These might be obvious to French people or to an English 
native whereas in Turkey these concepts are matters of controversy among politicians, scholars and 
even journalists. The reason here is the concept of laicité being imported from France. İnce (2007) 
underlines the term “laikçilik” should not exist in Turkish because it does not reflect the meaning of 
the French word; laicisme. İnce (2007) claims that this word is used in Turkey by some people, 
similar to despotism. However, in this thesis laicism (or laicisme in French) is used as the “doctrine 
of laicité” as it is defined in the dictionaries. In this thesis, secularism is mostly used for European 
countries, laicité and laicism for France; laiklik, laicism and secularism are used for Turkey. In the 
1982 Constitution of the Republic of Turkey it is stated ‘secular’ but since Turkey followed the 
notion of laicism that is similar to France, laiklik or laicism are also utilized. 
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state and religion, but also the separation of religion from educational, cultural, and 
legal affairs”. Thus the supremacy of religious institutions and ideas over others 
was going to be eliminated in this way. To express it in another way, modernization 
was not just limited to the governance of the state but also daily institutions that 
people were in interaction with. Only the full implementation of laicism in 
education, policy-making and administration of society could lead to a state where 
rule of reason and science would appear as the driving force behind modernization.  
 
A controversial point that is still debated in contemporary Turkey is the 
relationship between laicism and atheism (Yavuz and Esposito, 2003: xx). For 
Islamists, Kemalist laicism was the abolishment of Islam from Turkey. It is true 
that Atatürk supported the elimination of religion in the governance of the state 
with all its institutions that are opposed to modern state. In other words, Kemalist 
laicism was for reducing Islam to “a personal negotiation between the self and 
God” whereas the organization and regulation of the state affairs were left to the 
hands of “human actors” (Shankland, 2005: 49). Mustafa Kemal was well aware of 
the fact that during the War of Independence, the mobilization of the people could 
not be realized in the absence of religious feelings (Kramer, 2000: 57). Yet, this 
effort in laicism was often perceived as an anti-religious movement or the 
foundation of an atheist regime.  
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Laicism in Turkey has been formulated in terms of Kemalist principle. Kili (2003: 
356) accentuates this principle: “… the Atatürkist principle of laicism did not 
involve abolition but de-emphasis of Islam. The Atatürkist principle of laicism was 
not against an enlightened Islam but rather against an Islam that was opposed to 
modernization”.  The reforms aimed to restrict Islam into the private life of 
individuals (Tapper, 1993: 6). When this decision is evaluated under the conditions 
of the day, where the exploitation of religious feelings was the main threat for the 
new republic, it is inevitable to give credit to the decisions of Atatürk. In today’s 
circumstances it should not be the case since laicism should have been digested by 
Turkish society. Nonetheless, it became a reflex for ‘secularists’ to perceive 
religion in public space and in politics as a threat. 
 
The principle of laicism that is determined by Atatürk as a source for freedom of 
religion and conscience will be investigated in the following parts. With this 
feature, laicism seems to be the key for Westernization of the country by providing 
an environment of tolerance. The freedom of religion is protected by laws very 
strictly on the basis of respect to different religious beliefs. Moreover, the 
implementation of this notion can be said to constitute the very essence of Turkey’s 
integration with West; in other words, its modernization. In the upcoming chapter, 
laicism principle will be evaluated in the constitutional context by comparing this 
notion in Turkey and in France. 
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Laicité in France and Laiklik in Turkey  
 
Constitutional references to laicism are among the indications of the significance of 
this principle for the country. By relying on this statement, this thesis will refer to 
the articles of the Constitution of the Republic of Turkey where laicism is 
mentioned. It is assumed that this knowledge will be adequate in comparing Turkey 
and France in terms of laicism. Laicism in the West will enlighten to situate France 
in the overall picture of secularism in Western understanding. France, which is 
perceived as the heart of laicism in Europe will be investigated separately. These 
three indicators will be utilized in order to compare laicism in Turkey and in 
France.  
 
 
4.3.1 Laicism in the Constitution of the Republic of Turkey 
 
The principle of laicism42 is mentioned in the Constitution of the Turkish Republic 
in several articles. This underlines the significance of laicism for Turkish Republic. 
What is more considerable is that this principle is depicted both in the Preamble 
                                                 
42
 What should be reminded here is that in the translation of the Constitution in English, the word 
‘secular’ or ‘secularism’ is used for ‘laik’ in Turkish. This is important for this thesis since Turkey’s 
laik character is similar to the one of France. This differentiation in wording also indicates the 
special position of the Republic of Turkey in religious matters. 
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and under the provisions that cannot be amended or proposed to be amended43. In 
the Preamble it is indicated:  
The determination that no protection shall be afforded to thoughts or 
opinions contrary to Turkish National interests, […] and that as required by 
the principle of secularism44, there shall be no interference whatsoever of 
sacred religious feelings in State affairs and politics45.  
 
Article 2; which is one of the non-amendable articles of the Constitution the 
principle of laicism, asserts: “The Republic of Turkey is a democratic, secular and 
social state governed by the rule of law…” With this article, it is clearly indicated 
the characteristics of the Republic and laicism is one of these important and 
irrevocable provisions.  
 
Thus, none of these rights can be in contradiction with secular character of the 
state. It is prolonged to the Article 14 as follows: “None of the rights and freedoms 
embodied in the Constitution shall be exercised with the aim of […] endangering 
the existence of the democratic and secular order of the Turkish Republic based 
upon human rights”. 
Therefore, the rights and freedoms cannot be exercised at the expense of 
endangering the integrity (Article 14) of the Turkish state by damaging the secular-
laik- character of the state.     
                                                 
43
 In the Constitution of Turkish Rebublic there are articles that cannot be amended and cannot be 
proposed for such an amendment. These are the Article 1 (Form of the State), Article 2 
(Characteristics of the Republic), Article 3 (Integrity of the State, Official Language, Flag, National 
Anthem, and Capital) and in the Article 4 asserts the Irrevocable Provisions.  
44
 Read as laicism. 
45
 For the translation of the Constitution of the Turkish Republic visit: 
http://www.byegm.gov.tr/mevzuat/anayasa/anayasa-ing.htm 
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Another article that has been a matter of discussion and more remarkably, a matter 
of law is Article 68 since there had been political parties that were sued on the basis 
of this article. Article 68 sets the rules for organization of the political parties in the 
Republic of Turkey. Secularism-laiklik- is indicated among the other principles of 
Republic: “The statutes and programmes, as well as the activities of political parties 
shall not be in conflict with the independence of the state […] the principles of the 
democratic and secular Republic….”.  In the next chapter, I will try to put it in a 
table the political parties that were dissolved by the Turkish Constitutional Court 
on the basis of this article. 
 
In addition, in the Constitution of the Republic of Turkey not only political parties 
but also each and every person who becomes a member of the Turkish Grand 
National Assembly has to confirm his/her fidelity to the secular-laik- character of 
the Turkish Republic during the oath-taking. One must swear “[to] safeguard […] 
democratic and secular Republic” in order to become a member of the Turkish 
Grand National Assembly. It is also the case for the oath-taking of the President of 
Turkish Republic; as indicated in Article 103 (Taking the Oath).  
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Another reference to the secular character of the Turkish Republic is made in the 
Article 136; about the Department of Religious Affairs46. This article is very 
significant in terms of determining the responsibilities of the Department of 
Religious Affairs in the secular Turkish Republic. It is stated in the Article 136:  
The Department of Religious Affairs, which is within the general 
administration, shall exercise its duties prescribed in its particular law, in 
accordance with the principles of secularism, removed from all political 
views and ideas, and aiming at national solidarity and integrity. 
 
Article 174 (Preservation of Reform Laws) determines Atatürk’s reforms for 
modern Turkey that should be preserved: 
No provision of the Constitution shall be construed or interpreted as 
rendering unconstitutional the Reform Laws indicated below, which aim to 
raise Turkish society above the level of contemporary civilization and to 
safeguard the secular character of the Republic… 
 
These Reform Laws are of great significance in the laic character of the Turkish 
Republic since they are directly influential in the daily lives of Turkish people. 
These laws are on the Unification of the Educational System (1924), on the 
Wearing of Hats (1925), on the Closure of Dervish Monasteries and Tombs, the 
Abolition of the Office of Keeper of Tombs and the Abolition and Prohibition of 
Certain Titles (1925), on the principle of civil marriage according to which the 
marriage act shall be concluded in the presence of the competent official, adopted 
with the Turkish Civil Code (1926), the Adoption of International Numerals 
(1928), the Adoption and Application of the Turkish Alphabet (1928), the 
                                                 
46
 Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı. In the following sections, I will deal with the role and the significance 
of the Department of Religious Affairs in Turkey. Its settlement as well as its structure will be 
analyzed. 
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Abolition of Titles and Appellations such as Efendi, Bey or Pasa (1934) and the 
Prohibition of the Wearing of Certain Garments (1934). 
 
These articles all confirm that laicism is a key concept for the Republic of Turkey 
which is guaranteed in the constitution. The secular-laik- character of the Turkish 
state has been determined in the Constitution of the Republic of Turkey in a way 
that no one can change it. This is the conclusion that can be derived from the 
examination of the Constitution of the Republic of Turkey. The place of laicism in 
the Constitution of the Republic of Turkey will be re-evaluated in the comparison 
of Turkish and French laicism. A broader perspective on how the West perceives 
laicism would be helpful in realizing where these two countries are located in the 
overall picture.  
 
 
4.3.2 Laicism in the West 
 
 Laic state model is an artifact that can be seen in West after 18th century (Öktem, 
2002: 7). Before that time all the authorities were accepted as empowered by God. 
Laicité and/or secularism came into being as significant concepts due to the 
revolutions that occurred in the West. With these movements laicité found place in 
the constitutions of Western countries. Due to these bourgeois revolutions, the 
understanding of divine authority is replaced by national sovereignty and the 
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republican regimes have been established (Öktem, 2002: 8). The clergy has been 
kept away from the political scene in the Western countries. The laic and secular 
state is the result of the process where state-religion relations are regulated in 
political and legal structure of the state. In the work of Kili (2003: 354) it is 
indicated that laicism means more than the separation of Church and the state. This 
can be considered as one of the driving forces behind the development of Western 
culture. In this view, the attention is directed to the struggle between the state and 
Church which led to keep the authority over people unrestrained.  
 
Secularism in the West is understood as the exclusion of the religious domination 
over social and public life. More specifically, for Europe, secularism appeared as a 
solution to the wars of religion within the continent of Europe. “The separation of 
the state and religion became the bedrock of the European state system, and 
secularism became the constitutive feature of modernity” (Yavuz and Esposito, 
2003: xv). This explains how secularism became a necessity for peace in Europe 
and why it constituted the basis of modernity. Secularization in the West is still a 
matter of controversy and a divisive political issue. There are still questions of 
abortion rights, school prayers, headscarves in the state institutions in many 
Western countries (Toprak, 2006: 26). 
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4.3.3 Laicité in France 
 
The history of laicité in France dates back to the French Revolution and to the 
Declaration of Human Rights of 1789. In this declaration, French society met with 
the notion of laicism47. Burdy and Marcou (1995) highlight that in the 1790 
Constitution, the concept of laicism can be seen not as a means of separation 
between the state and Church but as the recognition of the state by Church. The 
declaration of 1790 also meant the restriction of the authority of Church by the 
people (Coşar, 2001: 45). However, after the mid-1800s Church started to refuse 
the Republican system but laicism, as ideology, kept its presence due to the support 
of the French people to this notion.   
 
The period that starts with 1801 and ends by 1905 is remembered with the presence 
of the concordat where the Catholicism is asserted as the religion of the majority of 
French people (Duffar, 2002: 50). By the abolishment of the concordat of 1801, the 
principle of laicité is indicated in the constitution in 1905. Separation Law of 1905 
mentioned that there was neither official state religion nor privileged religion by 
the state (Burdy and Marcou: 1995). The two principles brought by this law can be 
summarized as follows: The Republic neither recognizes nor supports any religion 
and the Republic recognizes freedom of conscience and guarantees the freedom of 
worship (Duffar, 2002: 51). The principle of this law was to keep the State neutral 
                                                 
47
 Article 10 of the Declaration of Human Rights please visit: 
http://www.elysee.fr/elysee/elysee.fr/anglais/the_institutions/founding_texts/the_declaration_of_the
_human_rights/the_declaration_of_the_human_rights.20240.html 
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against Churches and to prevent Churches to intervene into the political domain 
(Vaner, 2005: 21). Actually, Burdy and Marcou (1995) suggest that this inequality 
was not totally in the disadvantage of Churches. Thus, the separation was not an 
absolute one. On the contrary, Church; especially Catholic Church, preserved its 
links with the state. However, in the following years there had been inevitable 
struggles between the State and Pope. Church, which had lost its power to some 
extent, was faced with the strict attitude of the State.  
 
In the first article of the 1946 Constitution it is clearly stated the laique character of 
the state, after laying down the principles of freedom of conscience and other 
freedoms in the Preamble (Coşar, 2001: 56). Vaner (2005: 24) states that 1958 
Constitution was even more liberal in these issues; especially in the matter of State 
neutrality against religion by preserving the same distance against different 
religions and sects. With all these constitutional arrangements, the Republic of 
France could preserve laicité tradition of more than two hundred years. The fact 
that this principle has been on the scene since the 1789 French Revolution, makes 
French people more than familiar with the notion of laicism. Therefore, even if 
Church is still an institution that serves the spiritual life of the French people, is not 
influential over the political affairs as well as the administrative structure of the 
state. 
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4.3.4 Differences and Similarities of Laicism in Turkey and France  
 
There are two significant differences between laicité in France and laiklik in 
Turkey. The first stems from their dissimilar historical background, and the second 
from the difference of the place of laicism in their Constitutions. For a general 
assessment with reference to Duffar (2002: 44) about the difference between 
laicism in Turkey and in France, the linkage with the historical background can be 
observed. According to his view, laicism in Turkey is contemporary with the 
institutionalization of the Turkish State whereas in France, laicism is contemporary 
with the foundation of Republican regime (Duffar, 2002: 44). In addition, the 
struggle for a secularized worldview in the West reflected itself in France as the 
struggle against organized religion (Toprak, 2006: 26). This is well before Turkey’s 
encountering with the notion of laicism.     
 
For the constitutional references to laicism in Turkey and in France, a comparison 
can be made in terms of the frequency of the articles where this principle is stated. 
As it is investigated in the previous section, Constitution of the Republic of Turkey 
refers to laiklik ten times. Conversely, in the Constitution of the Republic of 
France, in the first article the freedom of conscience and religion are guaranteed in 
the first article and laicité is indicated once in the Article II (Çakır and Bozan, 
2005: 350). This does not necessarily mean that France gives less importance to 
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laicism but that they might be more comfortable due to their historical background. 
Çakır and Bozan (2005: 349) state that in France, laicism is described as the unity 
of Republic, as respect to plurality of religious and philosophical tradition and 
freedom of conscience. It can also be inferred that Turkey might need more to 
stress this notion in its constitution since it was a top-down adoption of the 
principle; enforced by law to the people who were not familiar with laicism at all. 
In France, it was the will of the people which is reflected in the adoption of laicism 
principle. This seems to be the basic difference in the constitutional context.  
 
The similarity of laicism notion between Turkey and France is very significant 
since Turkey is criticized by the EU because of this understanding. “Protecting the 
state from religious interference is pursued almost as rigorously in Turkey as it is in 
France, which reconfirmed its role as undisputed European champion of laicité in 
the beginning of 2004 by banning ‘ostentatious religious symbols’ in public 
education” (Netherlands Scientific Council for Government Policy, 2004: 46). In 
the following part, education will be analyzed as another input for further 
comparison between laicism in Turkey and in France.   
 
To sum up, the differences and similarities of laicism in Turkey and in France that 
are tried to be evaluated above can be summarized. There are two main reasons of 
difference: (a) historical background and (b) constitutional references.  
(a) Historical Background:  
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Time: French people met the notion of laicism in 1789 with Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights. Turkish people met laicism as an unfamiliar 
ideology in 1923 with the foundation of the Republic of Turkey.  
Way of encountering: French people struggled to settle laicism in the state. 
This was a bottom-up way of achieving laicism. Turkish people recognized this 
notion in a top-to-bottom manner, with the decision of Atatürk.  
(b) Constitutional References: In the Constitution of French Republic, there is 
one reference to the notion of laicism. In the 1982 Constitution of the Republic 
of Turkey, there are several references. 
 
When it comes to the similarities between France and Turkey in the principle of 
laicism, their definition and application of the notion are parallel. In both countries, 
the naissance of the principle is primarily aimed to protect state institutions, 
political and social life from the effect of religion. This can also be expressed as the 
“divorce of public affairs, including law and education, from religion” (Toprak, 
2006: 26). France and Turkey differ from other secular countries in the sense that 
the others perceive laicism as the guarantee of freedom of religion.  
 
The common understanding of laicism that brings France and Turkey together is 
also reflected in their stance toward religion in the education system. However, 
France made a sudden advance for the problematic issue of religious symbols in the 
schools and adopted the Law on Laicité in 2004. With this law, France resolved the 
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problem of religious symbols in the schools to a great extent. Turkey did not adopt 
such a law on laicism and the recent developments48 seem that Turkey will move to 
the other side of laicism which requires more religious freedom and no ban on 
religious symbols. Therefore, it can be stated that the notion of laicism, which can 
be defined as the protection of state institutions from religion, was very similar in 
Turkey and in France. 
 
 
4.3.5 Laicism in the Context of Education 
 
There are similarities between Turkey and France in terms of the place of religion 
in the education system. This part of the thesis analyzes those similarities as well as 
the different ways of dealing with the similar issues. Among these controversial 
matters, the mandatory religion courses and the conflicts about putting religious 
symbols on in the public schools can be enumerated. In France, there are also other 
problems on religion-education line such as the deciding the day for holiday which 
makes the religious education possible (Çakır and Bozan, 2005: 351). Turkey, in 
the last decade, debated the position of the vocational high schools for the training 
of prayer leaders and preachers (İmam Hatip). In this part, the thesis will focus on 
the similar problems and the different ways of dealing with those problems. In this 
                                                 
48
 Re-election of Justice and Development Party (JDP) in the elections of July 2007 showed that 
Turkish people support more freedom of religion and less state pressure over religion. 
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manner, it will be possible to make an analysis on Turkey’s compatibility with the 
European religious norms.    
 
First of all, it should be mentioned that both in France and in Turkey the religion of 
the majority is considered as the “leading conviction”49. The application of this 
principle differs in these two countries and they still cause problems. In France, 
there are no compulsory religion courses at the public schools at the moment, but it 
raised controversy until 1923 (Coşar, 2001: 71). There are private religion schools 
that get aid from the state. Despite the enactment of the Law of Separation in 1905, 
there has been a demand that the responsibilities to God should be taught in schools 
within the context of morality and civics. Yet, French Republic has opposed to this 
request, and since 1923, the religious-catholic-courses have been given only as 
elective courses. But now, there is an ongoing discussion about where to situate 
religion in the educational program; either to give it in the context of philosophy, 
history and literature courses or to add a new course on history of religions (Çakır 
and Bozan, 2005: 351). 
 
In Turkey it is still a question in dispute since the religion courses are mandatory in 
the public schools. In Article 24 of the Constitution of the Republic of Turkey it is 
stated:  
                                                 
49
 For the use of this phrase I refer to Coşar (2001: 63). She mentions that in Italy, it is called as 
Cultura Dominante which means Dominant Culture and that in Germany as Leitkultur for the 
Leading Culture 
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Education and instruction in religion and ethics shall be conducted under state 
supervision and control. Instruction in religious culture and moral education shall 
be compulsory in the curricula of primary and secondary schools. Other religious 
education and instruction shall be subject to the individual’s own desire, and in the 
case of minors, to the request of their legal representatives. 
 
These courses are organized in terms of the “leading” or “dominant” conviction of 
the people; which is considered in Turkey as Sunnite-a sect of Islam. People who 
have faith in Alevi Sect of Islam are opposed to mandatory religion courses for 
their children that do not comply with their conviction. This is one of the 
controversial issues in the place of religion in education.  
 
Another key issue is conspicuous religious symbols in schools both for France and 
Turkey. In France, by the amendment of the law of 15 March 200450, the principle 
of laicité, which is also a constitutional requirement, has expanded in the scope of 
the existing French Code of Education. With this law, the ban on conspicuous 
religious symbols in primary and secondary schools came into force. In Turkey, on 
the other hand, in public schools, these symbols have been banned. However, 
headscarf in universities is still a controversial issue in Turkey51.  
                                                 
50
 For the full text of the Loi no 2004-228 du 15 mars 2004 see:  
http://admi.net/cgi-bin/affiche_page.pl?lien=./20040522/MENG0401138C.html&requete=2004-
228#debut 
51
 It will also be evaluated in the following parts. What should be reminded here is that the headscarf 
issue is very problematical in recent years, especially in the days where the election of the President 
is being held. Headscarf in universities or from a broader perspective, in “public areas” is also a 
 63 
4.3.6 Comparison of France and Turkey in the Practice of Laicism: Religious 
Symbols in Schools 
 
The Table 452 concretizes the similarities and differences between Turkey and 
France in the case of a request for exemption from law on religious basis. I chose 
the case of headscarf that seems to cause similar problems in Turkey and in France. 
They followed different paths in terms of the reactions and resolutions of the cases 
that are subjected to the legal means. In the Turkish case, a sample is investigated 
since it reflects a common problem on the issue. For France, the headscarf issue is 
taken as a general problem. The type of action and the claim of the content are 
different for the two countries. The difference in the value basis of the questioned 
law makes the existing scene visible in the two countries. The value basis of the 
claim shows the difference in understanding of Turkish and French people. The 
value basis of the legal response determines the position of the state against such a 
request of exemption on religious basis. Legal outcome is of great importance since 
it seems to be an indicator on how state and the legal means respond and if it leads 
to a change in law. Social and political impact is another means of comparison for 
the reactions, responsiveness and involvement of Turkish and French people. These 
                                                                                                                                        
legal matter that will be assessed in this thesis in the context of Turkey’s integration with the EU 
and the decision of ECHR on this issue. Case Application no: 18783/91 
52
 See Table 4 in the Appendices. The subheadings according to which the cases are assessed are the 
original ones that are used in the collection of the cases for formation of the Euroethos database. 
EuroEthos Database, http://euroethos.lett.unitn.it/home.php?database 
 (accessed on: 24/07/2007). 
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indicators provide us some clues for a comparison in the understanding and 
application of the laicism principle in Turkey and in France53.  
 
Among the conclusions that can be deduced from this table, the most significant 
seems to be the legal outcome. The debates on religious symbols in Turkey and in 
France have been parallel in many terms. When it comes to the legal outcome of 
these debates, the two countries have acted differently. France enacted the law on 
Laicity in 200454 and the debates were over after this law. In Turkey, it is not the 
case. There are still very hot debates on headscarf issue in Turkey and such cases 
were brought before ECHR many times. The fact that the problem has been solved 
in France and not in Turkey does not necessarily mean that the principle of laicism 
is fully digested in France. On the contrary, it can be claimed that in France there is 
a state pressure over religion, for what the EU criticizes Turkey. In Turkey it is still 
a matter of controversy how the principle of laicism should be applied in the 
headscarf issue. The decisions of ECHR are in favor of Turkish Republic55; they 
indicate that Turkey is legally right in forbidding headscarf in universities.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
53
 Please see Table 4 in the Appendices. 
54
 See Chapter III.  
55
 It is referred to the case of Şahin v. Turkey. App. No. 44774/98 to ECHR please see the work of 
Cindy Skach.   
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CHAPTER V 
 
 
ISLAM IN LAIC/SECULAR TURKEY 
  
 
 
5.1 Turkey as a Secular-Muslim Country    
 
Turkey being the only country that generally succeeded to combine secularism, 
democracy and Islam, it has always been an idea-monger for the rest of the world. 
How to situate Islam in the secular democratic regime of Turkey has been a critical 
question for Turkey’s relations with the world; especially with Europe. Given that 
it has a 99 per cent Muslim population, Turkey seems to struggle both within the 
country in terms of balancing secularism, democracy and Islam, and outside in 
designing its relations with the West. It has always been controversial if Turkey 
belongs to Europe or is a part of the Muslim world. Turkey is unique with a 
Muslim majority society together with a legally laique political system (Vaner, 
2005: 73).  
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In the early years of the Republic, the aim of the leaders was to settle secularism 
but not at the expense of abolishing religious faith of Turkish people. Kramer 
(2000: 57) analyses this situation as: “Although the Turkish republic was conceived 
as a secularist nation-state by Mustafa Kemal, a conception that has become one of 
the cornerstones of modern Turkey’s state ideology, Islam never ceased to be 
important in the country’s public and political life”.  
 
This was a natural reaction to the “Kemalist top-down model of cultural and 
political modernization” by the “marginalized Islam” that gradually re-emerged 
with a “bottom-up influence” (Netherlands Scientific Council for Government 
Policy, 2004: 49). Since secularization was a movement that people were not 
familiar with, and may be were not ready for, Atatürk realized this reform as well 
as the others in a top-down manner. Nevertheless, it should not be underestimated 
that the way to impose secularism to Turkish nation was also critical for the leaders 
since it was a sensitive issue to decide how “to conduct the relationship with 
religious faith” (Shankland, 2002: 83).  
 
In the words of Kramer (2000: 60): “For many years the Kemalist principles 
remained alien to the majority of Turkey’s population”. Thus, reactions were 
expected but due to the decisiveness of Atatürk they were overcome for a time. 
However, in the following years, after the death of its founder, secularism did face 
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problems since the society did not digest it yet but just remained silent mostly out 
of fear. That is why, Shankland (2005: 50) is right in arguing that “a secularized 
Islam” could not be totally settled and implemented throughout the society. 
Nonetheless, the fact that “political pluralism in Turkey today includes political 
Islam” is an expected, if not prescribed, end for Turkey (Kramer, 2000: 69).  
 
The assertion above is critical by means of constituting the very core of the 
investigation of Turkey’s compatibility with the European norms. In other words, 
the rise of political Islam in Turkey is of vital significance for Turkey and for its 
consideration of the relations with the West. Turkey’s combination of secularism, 
democracy and Islam, has always been a strange mixture for the Europeans. It was 
also difficult to sustain it for Turkish people. Therefore, it is not a surprise that in 
Turkey, there had been periods where Islamism has emerged strongly. Wagstaff 
(1990: 1) comments: “Turkey, like other countries with a largely Muslim 
population, is experiencing a resurgence of Islam. It extends from the private 
domain of personal and family life out into society and affects politics, as well as 
economic behavior”. What can be inferred from this assessment is that Islam 
religion has sometimes penetrated to the private and public life via politics.  
 
In these terms, the interference of religion in Turkish society, in the political arena 
and in education will be evaluated by taking into account both the divergence by 
the years and the role of military, the strongest supporter of laicism, in this process. 
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First of all, I will try to evaluate the rise of political Islam in Turkey and its effects 
in the social life. This seems to be one of the concerns of the EU because there is 
the fear that in the case of Turkey’s membership, Islamism would penetrate into the 
Union very strongly. Furthermore, it is reasonable to continue with mostly debated 
issues and institutions in the context of religion in Turkey. The first is the military 
that is perceived as a guarantee for the laic character of the state. The second issue 
is the relationship between religion and education. This linkage is frequently 
discussed in Turkish society, politics and academia from two prominent 
perspectives; compulsory religion courses in primary and secondary schools, and 
İmam Hatip schools as another debated subject. The third controversial institution 
is Department of Religious Affairs (Diyanet). With an objective investigation, it 
will be illuminated if the living Islam in Turkey does contradict with the norms of 
the EU.  
 
 
5.2 The Rise of Political Islam-The Role of Political Parties 
 
The rise of political Islam is tried to be displayed in this part in order argue that it 
has been a matter of controversy in Turkey for many years. For this reason there 
had been fluctuations in Turkey’s political life. In trying to demonstrate the 
deficiencies in Turkey’s democratic life, this thesis aims to face with the problems 
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of Turkey that frighten Europeans. This thesis also tries to display these 
deficiencies are not threat to European cultural integrity.  
 
Turkey witnessed for the first time since its foundation a military coup in 1960 
which constituted a turning point in Turkish democracy. In addition to its numerous 
consequences, the 1960 coup can also be considered as the first pace for the 
appearance of political Islam on the scene. Ten years later, Necmettin Erbakan the 
prominent leader who has remained at the heart of the hot debates, founded first 
Islamic party, National Order Party (Tapper, 1993: 8). He has always been an 
important character in the context of political Islam in Turkey and stayed long 
temps on the political arena. His first party was dissolved by the decision of 
Constitutional Court in the following year. A year later, he established National 
Salvation Party (Shankland, 1999: 88). The movement which is headed by Erbakan 
is called as the “National View”. Dağı (2005: 24) states that the issues about 
Westernization, identity and culture constituted the core of the movement. In this 
view, “the West was conceived as ‘the mother of all evils’” (Dağı, 2005: 24). This 
party of Erbakan was supported by the people in the elections however, the 1980 
military coup closed down NSP in order to impede further fundamentalist 
activities. 
 
The Welfare Party (WP) that is established by Erbakan in 1983 regained the 
support of people (Shankland, 1999: 90). Dağı (2005: 25) analyses the success of 
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WP with these words: “In the early 1990s, the WP leadership came to realize the 
need for turning the party into a mass political movement, adopting an agenda that 
put stress on religious themes, using modern propaganda methods”. WP came first 
in 1995 general elections. This is the first time where “a pro-Islamic party came to 
power as a major force” and it constituted also another turning point in political 
Islam in Turkey (Dağı, 2005: 26). Here it should be reminded that among the 
reasons of success of WP, the rejection of Turkey’s application for membership to 
the European Community in 1989 represents vital importance (Dağı, 2005: 26).  
 
However, the presence of WP in the coalition government56 (Necmettin Erbakan as 
Prime Minister) brought the country to a grey area where Islamism is considered as 
a threat. In this environment, a “soft coup” has occurred as a result of perceived 
threat of Islamism in Turkey. Thus, the year 1997 witnessed another coup, with the 
declaration of National Security Council (NSC). Dağı (2005: 27) evaluates the 
decisions of NSC as being subjected “to reinforce the secular character of the 
Turkish state threatened by the Islamists”. This assertion also reflects the view of 
Turkish people in majority.  
 
The February 28 process has been initiated with the courteous intervention of the 
army to the rise of Islamism. With this event, the name of Erbakan has been erased 
                                                 
56
 54th Government of the Republic of Turkey. This was a coalition government of True Path Party 
headed by Tansu Çiller and Welfare Party of Necmettin Erbakan. The coalition government was 
leaded by the Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan. For more detail please visit: 
http://www.basbakanlik.gov.tr/sour.ce/index.asp?wpg=kabine&did=basbakanlik.123509 
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from the political scene of Turkey to some extent; he had to retire from active 
politics. From thereon, the Welfare Party is succeeded by Virtue Party and then, by 
Felicity Party. However, the most prominent formation was the establishment of 
Justice and Development Party (JDP) by Tayyip Erdoğan; one of the Erbakan’s 
students. In the elections of November 2002, JDP came first by receiving 34 
percent of the votes with the rhetoric of “democratic conservatism” and “center of 
the right” (Dağı, 2005: 30). So, JDP formed the government with the understanding 
of “keeping the ties with Islam in the social realm but abandoning it as a political 
program” (Dağı, 2005: 30).  
 
It is also accurate to highlight the divergence in the view of departure of the 
movement. The “National View” has changed its scope to a great extent. National 
view was based on consideration of West as the source of evil. The Felicity Party 
but especially, the JDP changed their perception on globalization, modernization 
and European integration. The JDP became the most prominent supporter of the 
RU membership. The table below summarizes what is asserted on the rise of 
political Islam in Turkey. 
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Table 2: Political Parties in the Rise of Political Islam 
Name of the 
political party 
Leader of the 
party (founder) 
Year of 
foundation 
Dissolution by 
Constitutional 
Court 
Elections-
Votes 
National 
Order Party 
Necmettin 
Erbakan 
1969 1971  
National 
Salvation 
Party 
Necmettin 
Erbakan 
1972 1980-military 
coup 
 
Welfare Party Necmettin 
Erbakan 
1983 After 1997 
“soft coup”, 
dissolved by 
Constitutional 
Court in 1998 
 
Virtue Party 
57
 
Recai Kutan 1998 2001  
Felicity Party Recai Kutan 2001  Nov. 2002-2.5 
percent 
July 200758-
2.34 percent 
Justice and 
Development 
Party 
Recep Tayyip 
Erdoğan 
2001  Nov. 2002-34 
percent 
July 2007-46.6 
percent 
 
 
One of the most significant differences of the JDP from its original National View 
Movement was its sympathy towards globalization and integration with the EU. In 
spite of these innovations in the understanding, the secularists in the county have 
always been suspicious about the Islamic background of the party leaders, who are 
at the moment leading the country. Abromowitz59 comments that Turkish 
                                                 
57
 Division in the movement; Virtue Party is succeeded by Felicity Party and Justice and 
Development Party. 
58
 For the election results of July 2007 please visit: http://www.gazetepark.com/secim2007/ 
59
 Morton I. Abramowitz was U.S. Ambassador to Turkey during the first Persian Gulf War in 1990-
1991. For the interview on “Major Political Clash in Turkey between ‘Secularists’ and ‘Islamists’” 
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“secularists” fear that a government headed by the “Islamist” party of Prime 
Minister Erdogan could turn back the clock and introduce religion into public life. 
These concerns reached a pick before the Presidential elections60 of Turkish 
Republic because of the possibility that one of the figures who has an Islamic 
background61 would become President made the secularists feel threatened. While 
this thesis is in progress, Turkey is witnessing important events62 that can be 
perceived as the reaction of secularists to the Islamism in Turkish State. 
Abromovitz analyzes the role of military in protecting secularism in Turkey: “… 
there are many sources of secularism, but the guardian of the secular state has 
always been the military. That’s one of their functions. They believe their duty is 
not just to defend Turkey, but to defend the secular regime”. In the next part, the 
role of military in the Turkey’s political life and the religion in education system 
will be investigated in the framework of Turkey’s secular character. 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                        
please visit: 
http://www.cfr.org/publication/13211/abramowitz.html?breadcrumb=%2Fpublication%2Fpublicatio
n_list%3Ftype%3Dinterview 
60
 Before the general elections of July 2007, the government tried to elect the new President but the 
coalition parties did not involve into the President elections. Coalition parties opposed to the 
candidate of the JDP and they asked for consensus. In this way, the Presidency election is ended up 
with a deadlock and general elections had to be held.  
61
 Abdullah Gül, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the 58th Government of the Turkish Republic is 
proposed as candidate. 
62
 There had been protest walks held by the secular camp composed of military, RPP and urban 
elites. The famous slogan was “Turkey is laic, will remain laic”. They were opposed to the 
candidate of JDP since his wife wears headscarf.  
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5.3 Issues/Institutions at the Center of Debates 
 
There are controversial issues about the place of religion in Turkey. The prominent 
concerns are mostly based on the idea that Islamism would penetrate into the social 
and political life of the country. This concern is shared by secularists in Turkey and 
by Europeans, as the fear of Turkey becoming an Islamic state. The following parts 
try to analyze if such concerns are accurate in the context of mostly debated 
issues/institutions. 
  
 
5.3.1 The Role of Military in Upholding Secularism 
 
Turkish army, dissimilar to the other institutions in Turkey, is the one which kept 
distance to Islamism. According to Shankland (Beeley, 2002: 93) this attitude can 
be called as “self-cleansing” policy of the army. The Turkish General Staff (TGS) 
perceives itself as the guardian of the state ideology of Kemalism (Jenkins, 2006: 
185). Not only TGS but also Turkish people consider the role of military as the 
guardian of the secularism in the country. Karaosmanoğlu63 underlines the fact that 
Turkish society perceives the Turkish Armed Forces as the most accredited 
institution with 80 percent. However, he also states that in the case of general 
elections Turkish people act opposite to what military tries to impose. Even if the 
                                                 
63
 The comment of Prof.Dr.Ali Karaosmanoğlu on “Sivil-asker ilişkileri için yeni bir fırsat” 
http://www.zaman.com.tr/webapp-tr/haber.do?haberno=570652 
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1960, 1970 and 1980 coups interrupted democracy in the country, Turkish people 
have always trusted the military in terms of providing security in the case of a civil 
war or when the fundamental principles of the Republic are seen to be at stake.  
 
The current developments in Turkey, the Presidential elections per se, showed once 
more that the shadow of the military can still be seen on the political life, contrary 
to what is expected by the EU from Turkey for the improvement of democracy. 
However, according to Göle (Hürriyet, 2007: 10) Turkish people wanted to 
“soften” the environment and they showed their reaction to the expected influence 
of the military on their votes in the General Elections of July 2007. For more 
concrete and objective assessment for the role of military in Turkish civil life, it is 
useful to refer to the Progress Reports prepared by European Commission64.  
 
It is indicated in the Commission Staff Working Document Turkey 2006 Progress 
Report (7): “There has been progress concerning the competence of military courts 
to try civilians”. However, for the role of National Security Council (NSC) in 
Turkish civil life, the Report is not very positive; it states (7): “The National 
Security Council (NSC) has continued to meet on a bi-monthly basis in line with its 
revised role. It has discussed domestic and foreign policy issues such as counter-
terrorism, internal security, energy security, migration, water policy and foreign aid 
                                                 
64
 2006 Progress Report Turkey. “Civil-Military relations” are investigated under the heading of 
“Enhanced Political Dialogue and Political Criteria”: Democracy and the rule of law. Retreived 
from: http://www.avrupa.info.tr/Files/File/ab_turkiye_reports/tr_sec_1390_en.pdf.  
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policy. The NSC has submitted reports to the government, including 
recommendations”. According to the Report, this influence of NSC can also be 
seen in the attitude of the Armed Forces: “The Armed Forces have continued to 
exercise significant political influence. Senior members of the armed forces have 
expressed their opinion on domestic and foreign policy issues…” (7). In addition 
the Report asserts: “The Turkish Armed Forces Internal Service Law remains 
unchanged. This defines the role and duties of the Turkish military and contains 
articles granting the military a wide margin of maneuver” (7-8). It is plausible to 
state here that according to European norms; Turkey has deficits in keeping the 
military distant from political life.   
 
It is obvious that for the EU, civilian control of the military is indispensable for 
Turkey’s full membership. According to Narlı (2000: 107): “The military’s 
prominent role in Turkey’s political affairs has drawn criticism from EU circles and 
became a major obstacle to the country’s integration into the EU…” The Turkish 
General Staff (TGS) supports Turkey’s integration to EU since it considers this as 
the means to reach Atatürk’s goal of Westernization (Jenkins, 2006: 186). In 
addition, the TGS believes that the membership will lead to welfare and high level 
of education in Turkey. In this way, people will be more attached to secularism in 
Turkey. What is more, the TGS is aware of the support of Turkish people for the 
integration with the EU, therefore does not want to contradict with the will of 
people. From the government’s perception, the EU membership is the way to limit 
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the interference of TGS in politics (Jenkins, 2006: 186). Therefore, both the TGS 
and the current government65 are in favor of the EU membership, with totally 
different considerations.  
 
 
5.3.2 Religion-based issues/institutions 
 
Education has been a very controversial issue since the foundation of the Turkish 
Republic. Atatürk perceived education as a part of state-building process. Bozan 
(2007: 7) evaluates: “During the early Republican period, the educational reforms 
enacted, were part of the larger nation-building and modernization efforts and 
contributed to the goal of undermining the role of religion in society”. It is crucial 
to remind once more the provisions of the Constitution about the education in 
Turkey.  
 
It is already mentioned that in the 1982 Constitution of the Republic of Turkey, the 
status of religion courses in primary and secondary schools has been converted 
from optional to compulsory (Mango, 1990: 16). The Article 24 on “Freedom of 
Religion and Conscience” as indicated previously, is of great significance 
especially in terms of the related paragraph66. However, here it might be 
                                                 
65
 JDP Government for the second time. 
66
 The paragraph is about the religious instruction being under the control of the state. 
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illuminating to refer to the official explanation of this article in the 1982 
Constitution (as cited in Mango, 1990: 16): 
Religious and moral education and instruction have been placed under state 
supervision and control in order to prevent exploitation and abuse. This 
education is compulsory in primary and secondary schools. Naturally, the 
scope of this compulsory education does not extend to non-Muslims. 
 
Therefore, it is argued by the Turkish state that the control over religious 
instruction in primary and secondary schools is aimed to protect freedom of 
religion and conscience. In other words, Turkish state aims to teach religion to 
children in order to impede the exploitation of their belief.  
 
In investigating the education system in Turkey we should refer to the law that set 
the current system in 1924, Law of Unification of Educational Instruction (Tevhid-i 
Tedrisat Kanunu). It replaced “existing pluralist modes of education with a secular, 
centralist and nationalist education system” (Bozan, 2007: 7). The establishment of 
the Faculty of Theology and Imam Hatip Schools67 has been realized as an outcome 
of this law. At that time there was not much interest in religious education and as a 
result İmam Hatip Schools were closed down68. But it was not an end to the story, 
just the opposite; İmam Hatip Schools became one of the controversial issues on 
Turkey’s agenda.  
 
 
                                                 
67
 The vocational high schools for the training of prayer leaders and preachers. 
68
 See Tables 5 and 6 in the Appendices. 
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5.3.2.1 İmam Hatip Schools 
  
The place, the importance and the role of İmam Hatip Schools have become very 
controversial after the 1990s; however, let us see how they evolved within the 
social and political scene of the country. But first, I would like to clarify why İmam 
Hatips became one of the most debated issues in Turkey. For this evaluation I will 
refer to the work of TESEV conducted by İrfan Bozan. Bozan (2007: 7) analyzes 
the evolution of İmam Hatip Schools in terms of their fluctuating existence in 
Turkey in accordance with the attitudes of the governments. The next part 
continues with their evolution in the political scene of the country. 
   
İmam Hatip courses have initiated during the Republican People’s Party (RPP) 
government in 1949 but they have been established fully during the Democrat Party 
(DP) rule in 1951 (Bozan, 2007: 14). As previously mentioned, these schools and 
the position towards them became a matter of politics. The governments of 
Demirel69 extended the opportunities for the graduates of İmam Hatip Schools 
(Bozan, 2007: 7). Between 1960 and 1980, only the 1970s were years where junior 
İmam Hatip Schools and İmam Hatip High Schools became matters of controversy 
but this did not cause an important tension in the country.  
 
After the 1980 military coup, there has not been an important increase in the 
number of İmam Hatip Schools while the number of the students who want to 
                                                 
69
 There had been three Demirel Governments between 1965 and 1971. 
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attend to these schools has increased70 (Bozan, 2007: 19). Kramer (2000: 61) 
analyzes this remarkable increment in parallel with the rise of political Islam in 
Turkey. By the mid 1980s the success of these schools continued to increase. 
Bozan (2007: 8) questions why İmam Hatip Schools became that popular. He 
concludes that the students who could both receive religious education from such 
schools, could also get financial aid in the form of scholarships. In the words of 
Kramer (2000: 61): “the number of İmam Hatip Schools has grown out of 
proportion”. In this growth, a prominent figure was Fethullah Gülen with his 
educational program that aims “to reconcile religious and secular elements that 
combines Islam with modern logic” (Kramer, 2000: 62). Kramer (2000: 62) also 
mentions that this movement of Gülen can be considered as “the contemporary 
representation of the view of Turkish-Islamic synthesis”71.  
 
From the secularist point of view, this movement is not necessarily perceived as 
such a synthesis, they are rather conceived as Islamist approaches threatening 
laicism. Another turning point for the İmam Hatip Schools came with the “soft 
coup”72 of February 28th, 1997 and they were affected negatively. The February 28 
administration followed two policies for marginalizing the İmam Hatip schools 
(Kuru, 2006: 150). The first one is the abolition of middle-school level, which is an 
                                                 
70
 For empirical data please see Table 5 and Table 6 in the Appendices. 
71
 Turkish-Islam Synthesis (TIS) wished to bring supposedly traditional shared values to the surface, 
to peel away the false Western veneer and to recognize a national synthesis of fundamental values. 
For this analysis and for more, please see Richard Tapper(ed.); “Islam in Modern Turkey”, 6.   
72
 For the February 28, 1997 soft coup, is also called by some people (for example, General Çevik 
Bir) as “post-modern” coup.  
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important reform prompted by the military; weakened the position of the İmam 
Hatip schools in Turkish educational system (Kramer, 2000: 62). The second one is 
to make a revision in the university entrance system (Kuru, 2006: 151). In the one 
hand, these efforts weakened the position of İmam Hatip schools in Turkey. But on 
the other hand, there had been an increase in demand for İmam Hatip schools.    
 
What is very significant here is to highlight once more the position of İmam Hatip 
Schools in the political scene of the country. Bozan (2007: 8) asserts: “İmam Hatip 
High Schools (IHHSs) have always been subject to cyclical politics”. The 
supporters of laicism call these schools as the “backyard” of political Islam (Bozan: 
2007: 30). This opposition constitutes the basis of the controversy on İmam Hatip 
Schools in Turkey. This summarizes the role and the situation of İmam Hatips in 
Turkey.   
 
After investigating İmam Hatip Schools, let us finalize this part by looking to the 
Turkish educational system in terms of religion-education dilemma. The words of 
Kramer (2000: 62) summarize the contemporary situation of Turkish educational 
system in terms of the role of secularism: “Now Turkish children have to follow the 
official secularist curriculum until the ninth grade and can only become exposed to 
a more religious education about the age of fourteen”. Thus, İHHSs might be a 
matter of controversy in Turkey but does not necessarily have to be an obstacle for 
Turkey’s membership to the EU.   
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From thereon, the thesis will continue with the other important institution that has 
been at the heart of hot political debates several times. As mentioned above, the 
structure of the Republican regime tried to keep the institutions responsible for 
religion in the country out of the political life. The Religious Affairs and İmam 
Hatip Schools are brought at the center of very controversial debates. It is argued 
that these institutions are attributed political roles that are different from their 
original raison d’etre. The position of the Department of Religious Affairs in 
Turkey should be evaluated. Its structure as well as its role in order to see how it is 
placed in the overall scene of secular Turkey will be studied.  
  
5.3.2.2 The Department of Religious Affairs (Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı) 
 
It is important to understand how the Department of Religious Affairs institution is 
situated in the secular Republic of Turkey where the majority of the population is 
Muslim. According to Bozan (2007: 68), the Department of Religious Affairs has 
been placed at the center of the relations between religion, state and society by the 
will of the founders of the Turkish Republic. In accordance with this decision, the 
Department of Religious Affairs has been regulating the religious life in Turkey for 
80 years, ruling the mosques and has been accepted as the only authority in 
religious matters in the eyes of Turkish citizens (Bozan, 2007: 68-69).  
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The settlement and the evolution of the Department of Religious Affairs fit to the 
principles of the Republic. For the first time, the structure and the position of an 
institution regulating the religious life of Turkish people appeared on the scene by 
the proposal of 50 parliamentarians in 1924 (Yeni Yüzyıl, Türkiye’nin Sorunları 
Dizisi-19: 5). In the proposal it is stated that the fact that religion and military are 
linked with the political streams has many disadvantages. They also asserted that 
this reality has been proven by many civilized societies and governments as a 
fundamental principle. In this respect, it is plausible to leave these institutions to 
the sovereignty of people. To keep this institution out the rule of Council of 
Ministers was consistent with the laic character of the state (Yeni Yüzyıl, 
Türkiye’nin Sorunları Dizisi-19: 5). With the adoption of this proposal, religious 
affairs were left to a technical institution which is placed in a secular structure. 
Also, Turkish Grand National Assembly (TGNA) took the role of legislation and 
the law of şeriat has been totally abolished.  
 
The provision of “religion of the state is Islam” is removed from the 1924 
Constitution in 1928 (Çakır and Bozan: 2005: 14). In 1937, laicism is added to the 
fundamentals of the state that are prescribed in the Constitution. I have already 
mentioned the related Article of the 1924 Constitution of Turkish Republic. 
However, let me remind once more that the 1982 Constitution referred to the 
Department of Religious Affairs under the “Execution” part. In addition to the 1961 
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Constitution, the Department of Religious Affairs is given the duty of providing 
“national solidarity and unity” (Yeni Yüzyıl, Türkiye’nin Sorunları Dizisi-19: 6).  
 
In order to be sure on where to place the Department of Religious Affairs in secular 
Turkish Republic, we should also mention its roles and responsibilities. We can put 
these roles under five headings: services of worship, enlightening the people on 
religious matters, services of Education of Religion, services on abroad and 
services for the foundation (Çakır and Bozan: 2005: 21).         
 
This institution does not contradict with the European norms. The fact that the 
Department of Religious Affairs is a technical institution reflects the secular 
character of Turkey. Regulation of the religious affairs with such an institution, 
which does not involve in political life, is useful for a country where the leading 
conviction represents the great majority of Turkish society. Therefore, this cannot 
be perceived as an impediment before Turkey’s compatibility with the European 
norms.  
 
This part aimed to provide a picture on the rise of political Islam in Turkey as well 
as the most controversial issues in this context. Furthermore, the place of Islam and 
laicism in Turkish political life and education system has been discussed in this 
chapter. We conclude that Turkey is not far from European democracies in terms of 
the relative place of religion in its political life and social (educational) life.   
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CHAPTER VI 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
 
The place of religion in Turkey’s cultural integration with the EU is a matter of 
European homeostasis73 as well Turkey’s effort to sustain equilibrium between 
Islamic tradition and secularism. In this context, this thesis argues that neither 
Turkey nor the EU has to be detached from its culture for further integration with 
each other. Conversely, they can bring together their differences in order to 
construct a new identity that embraces both Christian and Islamic tradition. In fact, 
it is the way to give an end to famous ‘clash of civilizations’ where both sides 
perceive each other as threat.   
 
                                                 
73
 Homeostasis is that property of either an open system or a closed system, especially a living 
organism, which regulates its internal environment so as to maintain a stable, constant condition. 
Multiple dynamic equilibrium adjustments, controlled by interrelated regulation mechanisms, make 
homeostasis possible. 
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In Huntington’s theory of the clash of civilizations, there are three requirements for 
a torn country to successfully redefine its civilizational identity (Huntington, 1996: 
139). These are; elites being supportive for such a move; public being willing for 
redefinition of identity and the host civilization (the West) being eager to embrace 
the conversion. The two first requirements are met by Turkey with the decisiveness 
of Turkish people. What is matter of question here is the third stage; willingness of 
the EU side.  
 
The first chapter; introduction, tries to draw a picture on how Turkey’s cultural 
integration with the EU is perceived. It argues that Turkey is perceived as a 
civilizational outsider to the EU. Due to this fact, it is claimed that different identity 
of Turkey, with specific reference to religion factor, has been put forward as a 
pseudo-criterion. It is stated in the introduction that the thesis will be based on the 
search of Turkey’s compatibility with the EU norms, considering the different 
religion factor.  
 
In this context, the identity issue arises as one of the main reasons for unwillingness 
of the EU to recognize Turkey as part of Europe. The second chapter refers to the 
constructivist approach in order make an assessment on how identities are 
constructed. It also tries to answer if they are unchangeable. This chapter concludes 
that identities are constructed and they can be reshaped according to the will of 
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human actors according to the new circumstances. Therefore, a relaxation in the 
definition of European identity in a way that it includes Turkey can be achieved.    
 
The third chapter is formulated to draw an overall picture of state-religion relations 
in the EU. It deals with Christianity being a fundamental element of European 
identity. When the legally binding documents are investigated, it is seen that there 
are no specific references to Christianity in those documents. This is one of the 
conclusions that can be retrieved from this chapter. Another remark is that there is 
no common practice for the state-religion relations in the EU member states. 
Therefore, in the absence of a single European model for the state-church relations, 
no a priori condition should be imposed to Turkey in cultural/religious terms. 
Consequently, it can be stated that among the shared values that are put in question 
in the research activities conducted by the EU, there is no value that is very strange 
to Turkey. It also strengthens the view on Turkey’s compatibility with the 
European norms.    
 
What is more, according to the European norms, secularism is the way of 
modernization and democracy (Toprak, 2006: 26). Hence, it is expected by the 
Community that member states embrace this notion. Nevertheless, bringing 
forward religion before secular Turkey, as a pseudo-criterion, does not seem to be 
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fair. In doing so, the EU seems say laisse-tomber74 Turkey which may cause many 
negative outcomes for both sides. 
 
The fourth chapter deals with the state-religion relations in Turkey which do not 
seem to be more controversial than in many European countries. Therefore, it is 
argued that demanding Turkey to resolve all religious controversies in the political 
and social sphere in the country is an unrealistic expectation (Netherlands Scientific 
Council for Government Policy, 2004: 9). This chapter also tries to bring out the 
Kemalist principles according to which the roots of the Republic are prolonged. 
Among the six arrows of Mustafa Kemal, the two notions; nationalism and laicism, 
which are more related to the motto of the thesis, are studied in order to reach a 
conclusion on their impact on Turkey’s compatibility with the European norms. It 
is concluded that Kemalist nationalism does not contradict with the European 
integration since it supports the achievement of the level of advanced 
civilizations.75  
 
The second notion; laicism, is tried to be betrayed in more detail with the 
controversies arose due to the understanding and application of this principle. The 
current system of laicism in Turkey is criticized by the EU from two paradoxical 
angles. First, it is asserted that the state has too much pressure over religious affairs 
and restricts religious freedom. Such a restriction contradicts with the core of the 
                                                 
74
 Never mind. 
75
 This is based on the view of Ziya Gökalp who upholds the achievement of the level of the 
advanced civilizations while preserving one’s own culture.  
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EU which gives great place to freedom of religion. Second, the EU is concerned 
that Islam is so influential in social and political life in Turkey that in the case of 
full membership, a different religion will be extensively apparent in the EU. 
Therefore, the expectation of the EU from Turkey fails to be consistent in itself. 
This chapter concludes that in Turkey, the state-religion relations are formulated in 
a way that it cannot be converted to an Islamic state. Therefore, with this aspect, 
Turkey does not constitute a threat to the EU. On the contrary to what has been 
concerned about, Turkey is a modern republic where the principle of laicism is 
rooted in the essence of state due to the principles of Atatürk. Hence, Turkey’s 
laicism displays its compatibility with the secular EU. 
 
In addition, Kemalist laicism in Turkey in the context of modernization of the 
country is considered to be on a knife edge. However, it neither allows the state 
pressure on individual faith nor permits Turkey to become an Islamic state. The 
paradox of a secular Union expecting from a Muslim country to maintain a less 
laicist attitude is perceived as a deadlock in Turkey’s full integration (Netherlands 
Scientific Council for Government Policy, 2004: 46). It seems bizarre that Turkey 
has to convince the EU both for its respect to religious freedom and Turkey being a 
secular country where şeriat is unthinkable. As a matter of fact, the importance of 
the equilibrium that Turkey has to hold becomes more apparent.  
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Since the general elections of November 2002; won by the conservative/pro-
Islamic JDP, Turkish people wanted to soften the radical secularism as state policy. 
In this way, the place of Islam is re-interpreted in Turkey. In the elections of July 
2007 they were once more in favor of a notion of secularism that guarantees 
freedom of religion and imposes less control over religion. Turkish people 
demonstrated that they were open for more freedom of religion, with religious 
symbols and diversities. They perceived the JDP not as an Islamic party but as a 
way for further democratization. Besides, JDP became the prominent supporter of 
the European integration due to the divergence in the “National View” movement. 
Therefore, it can be affirmed that Turkish people embraced the mosaic of culture in 
itself and they display their will for laic and democratic Turkey in addition to their 
willingness for European integration.  
 
In this context, the fifth chapter puts forward that neither the rise of political Islam 
nor the controversial practices in state-religion relations implies that Turkey is not 
sufficiently secular. This chapter tries to stick to an objective stance toward the 
debated issues in Turkey in the context of extensive Islamism in the country. These 
issues and the institutions at the heart of debates are tried to be brought out to show 
that these problems do not constitute an overhanging danger for European cultural 
integrity. The analysis about the place of Islam in Turkey and the recent 
developments which are tried to be examined in this chapter confirm that secular 
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nature of the Republic of Turkey does not allow şeriat76to prevail over secular 
laws.  
 
It is also accurate to make a last point on rise of religion as a strong figure in the 
world. Religion factor seems to have a crucial role in policy-making especially in 
the West. In such an environment, the invisible space between the EU and Turkey; 
caused by the cultural/religious difference, broadens to a great extent. However, 
this thesis tries to perceive this environment, which became noticeable after the 
9/11 terrorist attacks, as an extraordinary situation. It also argues that this is a 
temporary “trend” and will tend to decrease in the near future. The history displays 
the reliability of this argument since it is full of such rise and falls of ideologies.  
 
The thesis tried to display the difference of Turkey from the rest of the Muslim 
world by highlighting its secular character. In the absence of prerequisites for 
religion factor in the EU membership, there seems to be no prescribed impediment 
for Turkey’s full integration. The position of the EU against Turkey will also shape 
its stance against the rest of the Muslim world. Keeping in mind that Turkey is the 
only secular country with a majority of Muslim population, it will be in advantage 
of the EU to play the cards right. It is now time for Europeans to decide where the 
cultural frontiers of the EU end. In this sense, this thesis has an optimist stance for 
the relaxation in the attitude of the EU in terms of cultural/religious differences in a 
way that it embraces Turkey.  
                                                 
76
 Islamic law. 
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APPENDIX A 
 
 
 
TABLE 1: Overview of new member-states (2004)  
 
Country Most significant issues 
Cyprus No violations of right to freedom of religion are reported. 
Czech 
Republic 
Two tiered system of registration. 
A religious group may be registered with 300 adult adherents.  
10-year waiting period before application for full registration is 
possible. 
Full registration requires a minimum of 10,000 members. 
Churches registered before 1991 are not required to meet these 
conditions.  
Estonia State and church are separated although this has not been 
interpreted strictly in administrative practice. 
A protocol was signed between the government and Estonian 
Council of Churches. 
Hungary Due to strict criteria of the tax code, only donations to large or 
long-established churches are tax deductible.  
Latvia The state separates between “traditional” and “new” religions. 
Simultaneous registration of more than one religious union (church) 
in a single confession prohibited.  
Lithuania Four-tiered system dividing between traditional, state-recognized, 
registered, and unregistered communities. 
Both traditional and state-recognized communities can receive state 
subsidies. 
Non-traditional communities must present their religious teachings 
and their aims. This opens the way to state interference in internal 
matters.  
Malta Roman Catholicism is state religion. 
Since 1991 churches of all kinds have had similar legal rights. 
Poland No compulsory registration of religious communities. 
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All churches and recognized religious groups share the same 
privileges.  
Individual acts of religious intolerance take place; reportedly, they 
have no place in mainstream political discourse of society.  
Slovak 
Republic 
Only registered churches and religious organizations have the 
explicit right to conduct public worship services and other 
activities. 
20,000 Members required for registration. Official registration 
means State support of pastors and office expenses. 
Non registered denominations apply for a civic-interest association 
which is usually granted although officially illegal. 
Slovenia Registration of new religions is held up by Governmental office for 
religious Communities. 
Since August 2003, five minority faiths were registered, the first 
such registrations since 1999. Other applications are still pending. 
 
Source: Law and Practice. 2003 Religious Freedom in new and future EU member-
states.
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TABLE 2: Last two members (2007) 
 
Romania A communist era decree of 1948 remains the basic law for religion, 
although most of it nullified by the Constitution and governmental 
decrees. 
No recognition has been given after 1990 to any religious group 
except the Jehovah’s Witnesses in 2003, but 622 foundations have 
been approved.  
The commission in charge of granting approvals for the 
construction of places of worship entitled to decide on the 
“opportuneness” of building a place of worship. 
Bulgaria The 2003 Denominations act recognizes the Bulgarian Orthodox 
Church, thus outlawing the Alternative Synod. 
Registration is compulsory. All religious institutions are to be re-
registered with the Sofia City Court except the Bulgarian Orthodox 
Church which is recognized ex lege.  
Protestants are denied broadcasting time on public national 
television. 
 
Source: Law and Practice. 2003 Religious Freedom in new and future EU member-
states.  
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TABLE 3: Potential Members 
 
Croatia Concordats between the Government and the Vatican which allows 
state financing some salaries and personnel for priests and nuns. 
Other religions signed their own agreements with the state are still 
negotiating.  
Turkey Turkey does not fully meet the political criteria for membership. 
Non-Muslim religious communities face legal obstacles. They may 
not acquire property nor build new churches. 
All unofficial meetings for religious worship are considered 
potentially subversive. 
Evangelism regarded with suspicion; evangelists are sometimes 
arrested. 
 
Source: Law and Practice. 2003 Religious Freedom in new and future EU member-
states.  
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APPENDIX B 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 4: Headscarf Issue in Turkey and France  
 
TURKEY FRANCE 
Object: Headscarf in Universities 
 
Object: Headscarf in School 
Subject: Religious-Muslims 
 
Subject: Religious-Muslims 
Subject notes:  Sample of a Muslim 
woman who demands a diploma with a 
photo on which she appears with 
headscarf 
 
Subject notes:  School girls wearing 
headscarf on religious basis and being 
refused the right to enter in the class 
Type of action:  conscientious 
objection contra legem 
 
Type of action:  legal protest 
Content:  individual exemption from 
the law 
 
Content:  call for legal judgment 
Value basis of the law questioned:  
Article 130 of the Constitution- 
Universities consisting of various 
departments, having public legal entity 
and scientific autonomy are established 
by the government by means of laws, in 
a system based on principles of modern 
education and instruction 
 
Value basis of the law questioned:  
principle of laicity 
Value basis of the claim:  promotion of 
democracy-freedom of religion and 
conscience 
Value basis of the claim:  freedom of 
religion 
Value basis of the legal response:  
freedom of religion and conscience, 
Value basis of the legal response:  
republican principle of laicity in public 
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wearing of headscarf 
 
schools 
Legal outcome:  Administrative 
tribunal in Ankara decided that the 
practice of the University was in line 
with the regulations that aim to raise the 
youth as intellectuals, civilized and 
republican, so ECtHR decided that there 
was no violation of Art.9 of ECHR. 
 
Legal outcome:  15th March 2004 the 
law on Laicity banning the wearing of 
any “ostentatious” religious sign in the 
schools of the Republic. 
Social and political impact:  It is seen 
that ECtHR finds no violation of Art.9 
of the Convention and the case 
constituted a precedent. It was a 
significant decision in the discussion of 
"turban" context of “rise of political 
Islam in Turkey”. It is seen that from the 
European point of view, there is no 
violation of Article 9 of the ECHR on 
ban of headscarf in the universities. 
 
Social and political impact:  Before 
and during the adoption of the law, huge 
debate essentially a political one on the 
principle of laicity, on the French 
Republic and its relation to religion. The 
debate spread all over Europe.  
since the passing of the law, the debate 
has almost disappeared in France. 
Summary/ History of the claim:  
Application no: 18783/91 against 
Turkey.  
A Turkish national woman who 
terminated her studies in Gazi 
University in 1980 in the faculty of 
science education and got a certificate 
for graduation wanted to get a diploma 
with her photo on which she wears a 
headscarf. In January 27, 1984 she 
asked for such a diploma and in 
February 27, 1984 the administration of 
the faculty responded by a letter stating 
that the diploma has not been signed 
since she wears headscarf on the identity 
photo. Then she applied to the Ministry 
of Education in April 11, 1984, but by 
the letter of May 9, 1984 it is indicated 
that it was not possible to prepare a 
diploma unless the identity photo fulfils 
the requirements indicated about the 
regulations of dress. Then the case is 
brought before administrative tribunal in 
Summary/ History of the claim:  The 
debate started in 1989 when three girls 
refused to get rid of their headscarf 
before entering into class. After 
consultations with parents and students, 
The principal of the school ordered that 
they could wear the scarf at school, but 
not during the lessons. However the 
case sparkled a huge national debate. 
The French Upper Administrative Court 
(Conseil d’Etat) stated that the wearing 
of the headscarf was not incompatible 
with the principle of laicity. The 
government published an administrative 
memo which underlined the liberty for 
the school teachers to either accept or 
refuse the schoolgirls in class. From 
1994 to 2003, around 100 girls were 
excluded from high schools for wearing 
a headscarf. In one case out of two, the 
decision was annulled by the court. But 
this judicial uncertainty came to an end 
in 2004 with the passing of a law 
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Ankara in the same month with the 
claim of freedom of belief and 
conscience guaranteed by Turkish 
Constitution and the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights is 
restricted.  
With the judgment of December 10, 
1987 the Administrative Tribunal of 
Ankara, rejected the application of the 
applicant by indicating that the 
regulations of dress that the student 
should comply with during their school 
life are also valid for the identity photos. 
First instance, these regulations are 
established in educational 
establishments and in universities in 
order to raise the youth as “intellectuals, 
civilized and republican”. And second 
instance is that these regulations require 
that there should be nothing on the head.  
In May 12, 1988 the applicant brought 
the case before the Council of State. She 
defended again her right to freedom of 
belief and religion and referred to the 
ECHR. She also claimed that she was 
“intellectual, civilized and republican”. 
In the Council of State the majority 
decided that the decision of the 
university was based on laws and 
procedure. But two members dissented 
by claiming that there is no regulation 
about the photograph. The applicant 
added that the regulation on the ban on 
wearing headscarf in universities 
became valid after December 1989. In 
December 14, 1990 the Council of State 
charged the applicant a compensation of 
5000 TL because of abusive application 
("recours abusif").  
Up until now, the procedure of national 
law and the decisions of the 
Administrative Tribunal and the Council 
of State are evaluated. After that an 
application is made to European 
banning the wearing of any 
“ostentatious” religious signs 
(headscarf, kippa, big cross…)in public 
schools. The law was passed after 
several months of Parliamentary and 
public debate focusing on the principle 
of laicity. One of the most strenuous 
supporters of this principle was 
president Chirac who had initiated the 
law. Some political leaders defended a 
new approach in France that is the one 
of recognition of religion on the public 
sphere.  
In public hospitals the medical staff is to 
respect the principle of laicity. The 
freedom of the patients on the contrary 
is recognized. 
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Commission of Human Rights in June 
18, 1991 and was registered in 
September 11, 1991. It is mentioned that 
there was violation of Articles 5, 8 and 9 
of the Convention and Article 2 of the 
Additional Protocol. The Commission 
examined the application under Article 
9 of the Convention.  
After the investigation, the Commission 
decided that in the secular system, the 
university students are obliged to obey 
the rules which aim to settle respect the 
rights and freedoms of others. And for 
other reasons, the Commission decided 
that the there was no violation of the 
right guaranteed by Article 9 par. 1 of 
the Convention. With these motives (in 
addition to the others) the Commission 
decided by majority that the appeal is 
unacceptable. 
Source: EuroEthos Database, http://euroethos.lett.unitn.it/home.php?database 
 (accessed on: 24/07/2007). 
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APPENDIX C 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 5: Yearly Proportion of the Number of İHL Students to 
the Number of Students in Secondary Education 
 
(Yıllara Göre İHL Öğrenci Sayısının Ortaöğretim Toplam Öğrenci Sayısına Oranı-
Lise Kısmı) 
   
 
 
Source: Bozan, İrfan. 2007. Devlet ile Toplum Arasında Bir Okul: İmam Hatip 
Liseleri, Bir Kurum: Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı. İstanbul: TESEV Yayınları. p. 22. 
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TABLE 6: Number of İHL Students per Year 
(Yıllara Göre İHL Öğrenci Sayısı) 
 
 
 
 
Source: Bozan, İrfan. 2007. Devlet ile Toplum Arasında Bir Okul: İmam Hatip 
Liseleri, Bir Kurum: Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı. İstanbul: TESEV Yayınları. p. 23. 
 
 
 
 
